Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'My Philosophical Development', 'works' and 'Grundlagen (Foundations of Theory of Manifolds)'

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36 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
6420 Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell]
6432 Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
6437 The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
6442 Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15946 Cantor developed sets from a progression into infinity by addition, multiplication and exponentiation [Cantor, by Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
6436 I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
7528 Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
6439 Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
15911 Ordinals are generated by endless succession, followed by a limit ordinal [Cantor, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
6423 We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 7. Formalism
6424 Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell]
6425 Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
6426 Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
22121 The concept of being has only one meaning, whether talking of universals or of God [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
22122 Being (not sensation or God) is the primary object of the intellect [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
6419 In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell]
6438 Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
6434 Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
22125 Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
6440 Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
22127 Scotus said a substantial principle of individuation [haecceitas] was needed for an essence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
22126 Avicenna and Duns Scotus say essences have independent and prior existence [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
6430 In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
22129 Certainty comes from the self-evident, from induction, and from self-awareness [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
22130 Scotus defended direct 'intuitive cognition', against the abstractive view [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 2. Self-Evidence
22128 Augustine's 'illumination' theory of knowledge leads to nothing but scepticism [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 3. Pragmatism
6441 Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
6431 Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / b. Gettier problem
6444 True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
22131 The will retains its power for opposites, even when it is acting [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
6433 Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
6443 Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
6427 Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
6435 You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
22123 The concept of God is the unique first efficient cause, final cause, and most eminent being [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
22124 We can't infer the infinity of God from creation ex nihilo [Duns Scotus, by Dumont]