13 ideas
| 16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
| 8978 | Events are made of other things, and are not fundamental to ontology [Bennett] |
| 15148 | Powers give explanations, without being necessary for some class membership [Chakravartty] |
| 15145 | A kind essence is the necessary and sufficient properties for membership of a class [Chakravartty] |
| 15147 | Cluster kinds are explained simply by sharing some properties, not by an 'essence' [Chakravartty] |
| 16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
| 16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
| 15144 | Explanation of causal phenomena concerns essential kinds - but also lack of them [Chakravartty] |
| 16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
| 15146 | Some kinds, such as electrons, have essences, but 'cluster kinds' do not [Chakravartty] |
| 10364 | Facts are about the world, not in it, so they can't cause anything [Bennett] |
| 15151 | Many causal laws do not refer to kinds, but only to properties [Chakravartty] |
| 4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |