Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Propositions: What they are,and Meaning', 'Introduction to the Theory of Logic' and 'The Art of Rhetoric'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


44 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Desired responsible actions result either from rational or from irrational desire [Aristotle]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
It is the role of dialectic to survey syllogisms [Aristotle]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Sets can be defined by 'enumeration', or by 'abstraction' (based on a property) [Zalabardo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
The 'Cartesian Product' of two sets relates them by pairing every element with every element [Zalabardo]
A 'partial ordering' is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive [Zalabardo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Determinacy: an object is either in a set, or it isn't [Zalabardo]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / l. Axiom of Specification
Specification: Determinate totals of objects always make a set [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
A first-order 'sentence' is a formula with no free variables [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
Γ |= φ for sentences if φ is true when all of Γ is true [Zalabardo]
Γ |= φ if φ is true when all of Γ is true, for all structures and interpretations [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / b. Basic connectives
Propositional logic just needs ¬, and one of ∧, ∨ and → [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 1. Semantics of Logic
The semantics shows how truth values depend on instantiations of properties and relations [Zalabardo]
We can do semantics by looking at given propositions, or by building new ones [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
We make a truth assignment to T and F, which may be true and false, but merely differ from one another [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
'Logically true' (|= φ) is true for every truth-assignment [Zalabardo]
Logically true sentences are true in all structures [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
A sentence-set is 'satisfiable' if at least one truth-assignment makes them all true [Zalabardo]
Some formulas are 'satisfiable' if there is a structure and interpretation that makes them true [Zalabardo]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
A structure models a sentence if it is true in the model, and a set of sentences if they are all true in the model [Zalabardo]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
If a set is defined by induction, then proof by induction can be applied to it [Zalabardo]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
A single counterexample is enough to prove that a truth is not necessary [Aristotle]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Nobody fears a disease which nobody has yet caught [Aristotle]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]
A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric is a political offshoot of dialectic and ethics [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Pentathletes look the most beautiful, because they combine speed and strength [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
Men are physically prime at thirty-five, and mentally prime at forty-nine [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
We all feel universal right and wrong, independent of any community or contracts [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Happiness is composed of a catalogue of internal and external benefits [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
Self-interest is a relative good, but nobility an absolute good [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The best virtues are the most useful to others [Aristotle]
All good things can be misused, except virtue [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
The young feel pity from philanthropy, but the old from self-concern [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
Rich people are mindlessly happy [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The four constitutions are democracy (freedom), oligarchy (wealth), aristocracy (custom), tyranny (security) [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
It is noble to avenge oneself on one's enemies, and not come to terms with them [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
People assume events cause what follows them [Aristotle]