16 ideas
| 10528 | Definitions concern how we should speak, not how things are [Fine,K] |
| 23476 | Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell] |
| 23477 | We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell] |
| 18273 | Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell] |
| 10529 | If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K] |
| 10530 | Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K] |
| 16039 | Supervenience: No A-difference without a B-difference [Bennett,K] |
| 16043 | Supervenience is non-symmetric - sometimes it's symmetric, and sometimes it's one-way [Bennett,K] |
| 16047 | Weak supervenience is in one world, strong supervenience in all possible worlds [Bennett,K] |
| 16040 | Aesthetics, morality and mind supervene on the physical? Modal on non-modal? General on particular? [Bennett,K] |
| 16044 | Some entailments do not involve supervenience, as when brotherhood entails siblinghood [Bennett,K] |
| 16046 | Reduction requires supervenience, but does supervenience suffice for reduction? [Bennett,K] |
| 16049 | Definitions of physicalism are compatible with a necessary God [Bennett,K] |
| 22315 | There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell] |
| 16042 | The metaphysically and logically possible worlds are the same, so they are the same strength [Bennett,K] |
| 10527 | An abstraction principle should not 'inflate', producing more abstractions than objects [Fine,K] |