37 ideas
19456 | Philosophy is distinguished from other sciences by its complete lack of presuppositions [Feuerbach] |
6118 | Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis [Russell] |
6116 | A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell] |
6117 | Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error [Russell] |
7689 | The modal logic of C.I.Lewis was only interpreted by Kripke and Hintikka in the 1960s [Jacquette] |
6110 | Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell] |
7681 | Logic describes inferences between sentences expressing possible properties of objects [Jacquette] |
6107 | It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell] |
7682 | Logic is not just about signs, because it relates to states of affairs, objects, properties and truth-values [Jacquette] |
6115 | Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell] |
7697 | On Russell's analysis, the sentence "The winged horse has wings" comes out as false [Jacquette] |
6109 | Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell] |
7701 | Can a Barber shave all and only those persons who do not shave themselves? [Jacquette] |
6108 | Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations [Russell] |
7707 | To grasp being, we must say why something exists, and why there is one world [Jacquette] |
7692 | Being is maximal consistency [Jacquette] |
7687 | Existence is completeness and consistency [Jacquette] |
10968 | Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read] |
6113 | To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell] |
6114 | 'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell] |
21722 | Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell] |
7679 | Ontology is the same as the conceptual foundations of logic [Jacquette] |
6111 | As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell] |
7678 | Ontology must include the minimum requirements for our semantics [Jacquette] |
7683 | Logic is based either on separate objects and properties, or objects as combinations of properties [Jacquette] |
7684 | Reduce states-of-affairs to object-property combinations, and possible worlds to states-of-affairs [Jacquette] |
7703 | If classes can't be eliminated, and they are property combinations, then properties (universals) can't be either [Jacquette] |
7685 | An object is a predication subject, distinguished by a distinctive combination of properties [Jacquette] |
7699 | Numbers, sets and propositions are abstract particulars; properties, qualities and relations are universals [Jacquette] |
7691 | The actual world is a consistent combination of states, made of consistent property combinations [Jacquette] |
7688 | The actual world is a maximally consistent combination of actual states of affairs [Jacquette] |
7695 | Do proposition-structures not associated with the actual world deserve to be called worlds? [Jacquette] |
7694 | We must experience the 'actual' world, which is defined by maximally consistent propositions [Jacquette] |
7706 | If qualia supervene on intentional states, then intentional states are explanatorily fundamental [Jacquette] |
7704 | Reduction of intentionality involving nonexistent objects is impossible, as reduction must be to what is actual [Jacquette] |
6112 | Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell] |
7702 | The extreme views on propositions are Frege's Platonism and Quine's extreme nominalism [Jacquette] |