113 ideas
| 11006 | Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell] |
| 2512 | Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language [Wittgenstein] |
| 4148 | What is your aim in philosophy? - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle [Wittgenstein] |
| 22490 | Bring words back from metaphysics to everyday use [Wittgenstein] |
| 6566 | The problem is to explain the role of contradiction in social life [Wittgenstein] |
| 18915 | If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen] |
| 18919 | There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen] |
| 18913 | Traditional term logic struggled to express relations [Engelbretsen] |
| 18907 | Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen] |
| 18912 | Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen] |
| 18944 | Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell] |
| 7758 | 'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 18743 | Wittgenstein says we want the grammar of problems, not their first-order logical structure [Wittgenstein, by Horsten/Pettigrew] |
| 18922 | Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen] |
| 18905 | Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen] |
| 18908 | Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen] |
| 5772 | The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell] |
| 4139 | Naming is a preparation for description [Wittgenstein] |
| 4945 | Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke] |
| 18942 | Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| 7745 | Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell] |
| 4946 | A name is not determined by a description, but by a cluster or family [Wittgenstein, by Kripke] |
| 18941 | Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer] |
| 15159 | The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames] |
| 10449 | Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach] |
| 2612 | Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer] |
| 7757 | "Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
| 6411 | Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell] |
| 10433 | Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
| 1608 | The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine] |
| 7754 | Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 21529 | Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey] |
| 6333 | The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich] |
| 6412 | Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell] |
| 7743 | Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh] |
| 7310 | Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| 12006 | Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G] |
| 4569 | Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| 11009 | Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell] |
| 21549 | The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell] |
| 12796 | Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell] |
| 7532 | Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk] |
| 11988 | Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell] |
| 6061 | Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn] |
| 18917 | Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen] |
| 18916 | Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen] |
| 18775 | Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
| 7533 | The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk] |
| 18921 | Individuals are arranged in inclusion categories that match our semantics [Engelbretsen] |
| 6063 | Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell] |
| 18777 | If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell] |
| 15106 | Essence is expressed by grammar [Wittgenstein] |
| 6600 | The belief that fire burns is like the fear that it burns [Wittgenstein] |
| 4153 | Are sense-data the material of which the universe is made? [Wittgenstein] |
| 6501 | As sense-data are necessarily private, they are attacked by Wittgenstein's objections [Wittgenstein, by Robinson,H] |
| 11079 | How do I decide when to accept or obey an intuition? [Wittgenstein] |
| 4160 | One can mistrust one's own senses, but not one's own beliefs [Wittgenstein] |
| 19273 | I don't have the opinion that people have minds; I just treat them as such [Wittgenstein] |
| 5663 | It is irresponsible to generalise from my own case of pain to other people's [Wittgenstein] |
| 19272 | To imagine another's pain by my own, I must imagine a pain I don't feel, by one I do feel [Wittgenstein] |
| 4161 | If a lion could talk, we could not understand him [Wittgenstein] |
| 7392 | If a lion could talk, it would be nothing like other lions [Dennett on Wittgenstein] |
| 5676 | To say that I 'know' I am in pain means nothing more than that I AM in pain [Wittgenstein] |
| 4154 | Why are we not aware of the huge gap between mind and brain in ordinary life? [Wittgenstein] |
| 4158 | An 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria [Wittgenstein] |
| 6165 | Every course of action can either accord or conflict with a rule, so there is no accord or conflict [Wittgenstein] |
| 4143 | One cannot obey a rule 'privately', because that is a practice, not the same as thinking one is obeying [Wittgenstein] |
| 7092 | If individuals can't tell if they are following a rule, how does a community do it? [Grayling on Wittgenstein] |
| 4138 | Is white simple, or does it consist of the colours of the rainbow? [Wittgenstein] |
| 7055 | Externalist accounts of mental content begin in Wittgenstein [Wittgenstein, by Heil] |
| 12576 | Possessing a concept is knowing how to go on [Wittgenstein, by Peacocke] |
| 4157 | Concepts direct our interests and investigations, and express those interests [Wittgenstein] |
| 12606 | Man learns the concept of the past by remembering [Wittgenstein] |
| 4141 | Various games have a 'family resemblance', as their similarities overlap and criss-cross [Wittgenstein] |
| 23450 | Wittgenstein rejected his earlier view that the form of language is the form of the world [Wittgenstein, by Morris,M] |
| 4150 | Asking about verification is only one way of asking about the meaning of a proposition [Wittgenstein] |
| 6567 | For Wittgenstein, words are defined by their use, just as chess pieces are [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| 6169 | We do not achieve meaning and understanding in our heads, but in the world [Wittgenstein, by Rowlands] |
| 4155 | We all seem able to see quite clearly how sentences represent things when we use them [Wittgenstein] |
| 4137 | In the majority of cases the meaning of a word is its use in the language [Wittgenstein] |
| 4142 | To understand a sentence means to understand a language [Wittgenstein] |
| 4149 | We don't have 'meanings' in our minds in addition to verbal expressions [Wittgenstein] |
| 4156 | Make the following experiment: say "It's cold here" and mean "It's warm here" [Wittgenstein] |
| 4567 | Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
| 4145 | How do words refer to sensations? [Wittgenstein] |
| 18918 | Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen] |
| 16385 | A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati] |
| 5774 | Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell] |
| 5775 | In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell] |
| 5810 | Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell] |
| 4140 | The standard metre in Paris is neither one metre long nor not one metre long [Wittgenstein] |
| 16987 | By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke] |
| 4570 | Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell] |
| 16349 | Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati] |
| 7313 | 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A] |
| 7767 | The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan] |
| 18920 | 'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen] |
| 21726 | In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell] |
| 18906 | Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen] |
| 6166 | Was Wittgenstein's problem between individual and community, or between occasions for an individual? [Rowlands on Wittgenstein] |
| 7875 | If a brilliant child invented a name for a private sensation, it couldn't communicate it [Wittgenstein] |
| 4146 | We cannot doublecheck mental images for correctness (or confirm news with many copies of the paper) [Wittgenstein] |
| 4147 | If we only named pain by our own case, it would be like naming beetles by looking in a private box [Wittgenstein] |
| 5659 | If the reference is private, that is incompatible with the sense being public [Wittgenstein, by Scruton] |
| 4152 | Getting from perceptions to words cannot be a private matter; the rules need an institution of use [Wittgenstein] |
| 4136 | To imagine a language means to imagine a form of life [Wittgenstein] |
| 4144 | Common human behaviour enables us to interpret an unknown language [Wittgenstein] |
| 11049 | To communicate, language needs agreement in judgment as well as definition [Wittgenstein] |
| 6658 | What is left over if I subtract my arm going up from my raising my arm? [Wittgenstein] |
| 5773 | The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell] |
| 4151 | Grammar tells what kind of object anything is - and theology is a kind of grammar [Wittgenstein] |
| 4159 | The human body is the best picture of the human soul [Wittgenstein] |