14 ideas
| 5784 | In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell] |
| 5777 | The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell] |
| 6343 | For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell] |
| 5783 | Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell] |
| 15102 | S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron] |
| 15103 | Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron] |
| 5780 | The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell] |
| 5778 | If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell] |
| 5779 | There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell] |
| 5781 | Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell] |
| 5782 | A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell] |
| 5776 | A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell] |
| 7534 | In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk] |
| 15104 | The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron] |