34 ideas
| 6118 | Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis [Russell] |
| 18274 | Analysis complicates a statement, but only as far as the complexity of its meaning [Wittgenstein] |
| 6116 | A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell] |
| 6117 | Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error [Russell] |
| 6110 | Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell] |
| 16908 | We can dispense with self-evidence, if language itself prevents logical mistakes [Jeshion on Wittgenstein] |
| 6107 | It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell] |
| 18276 | A statement's logical form derives entirely from its constituents [Wittgenstein] |
| 6115 | Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell] |
| 6563 | 'And' and 'not' are non-referring terms, which do not represent anything [Wittgenstein, by Fogelin] |
| 6109 | Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell] |
| 6108 | Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations [Russell] |
| 10968 | Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read] |
| 6113 | To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell] |
| 6114 | 'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell] |
| 21722 | Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell] |
| 23472 | The sense of propositions relies on the world's basic logical structure [Wittgenstein] |
| 6111 | As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell] |
| 23500 | My main problem is the order of the world, and whether it is knowable a priori [Wittgenstein] |
| 22323 | The philosophical I is the metaphysical subject, the limit - not a part of the world [Wittgenstein] |
| 6112 | Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell] |
| 23481 | Propositions assemble a world experimentally, like the model of a road accident [Wittgenstein] |
| 23814 | Every human yearns for an unattainable transcendent good [Weil] |
| 23824 | Where human needs are satisfied we find happiness, friendship and beauty [Weil] |
| 23815 | We cannot equally respect what is unequal, so equal respect needs a shared ground [Weil] |
| 23823 | Life needs risks to avoid sickly boredom [Weil] |
| 23822 | We all need to partipate in public tasks, and take some initiative [Weil] |
| 23817 | We need both equality (to attend to human needs) and hierarchy (as a scale of responsibilities) [Weil] |
| 23819 | Deliberate public lying should be punished [Weil] |
| 23818 | We have liberty in the space between nature and accepted authority [Weil] |
| 23820 | People need personal and collective property, and a social class lacking property is shameful [Weil] |
| 23821 | Crime should be punished, to bring the perpetrator freely back to morality [Weil] |
| 4678 | Absolute prohibitions are the essence of ethics, and suicide is the most obvious example [Wittgenstein] |
| 23816 | Attention to a transcendent reality motivates a duty to foster the good of humanity [Weil] |