68 ideas
| 12170 | Amusement rests on superiority, or relief, or incongruity [Scruton] |
| 12173 | The central object of amusement is the human [Scruton] |
| 12169 | Since only men laugh, it seems to be an attribute of reason [Scruton] |
| 12172 | Objects of amusement do not have to be real [Scruton] |
| 6420 | Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell] |
| 6432 | Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell] |
| 6437 | The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell] |
| 6442 | Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell] |
| 6436 | I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell] |
| 7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
| 6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
| 6423 | We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell] |
| 6424 | Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell] |
| 6425 | Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell] |
| 6426 | Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell] |
| 6419 | In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell] |
| 6438 | Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell] |
| 6434 | Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell] |
| 6440 | Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell] |
| 6430 | In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell] |
| 5937 | The goodness of opinions depends on their grounds, and corresponding degrees of conviction [Ross] |
| 5936 | Knowledge is superior to opinion because it is certain [Ross] |
| 5927 | I prefer the causal theory to sense data, because sensations are events, not apprehensions [Ross] |
| 6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
| 6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
| 6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
| 5940 | Two goods may be comparable, although they are not commensurable [Ross] |
| 6433 | Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell] |
| 5924 | Identical objects must have identical value [Ross] |
| 12174 | Only rational beings are attentive without motive or concern [Scruton] |
| 6443 | Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell] |
| 6427 | Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell] |
| 6435 | You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell] |
| 5933 | Aesthetic enjoyment combines pleasure with insight [Ross] |
| 5928 | Beauty is neither objective nor subjective, but a power of producing certain mental events [Ross] |
| 5911 | Moral duties are as fundamental to the universe as the axioms of mathematics [Ross] |
| 5926 | The beauty of a patch of colour might be the most important fact about it [Ross] |
| 7259 | Ross said moral principles are self-evident from the facts, but not from pure thought [Ross, by Dancy,J] |
| 5913 | The moral convictions of thoughtful educated people are the raw data of ethics [Ross] |
| 5920 | Value is held to be either a quality, or a relation (usually between a thing and a mind) [Ross] |
| 5923 | The arguments for value being an objective or a relation fail, so it appears to be a quality [Ross] |
| 5918 | The thing is intrinsically good if it would be good when nothing else existed [Ross] |
| 5930 | All things being equal, we all prefer the virtuous to be happy, not the vicious [Ross] |
| 5922 | An instrumentally good thing might stay the same, but change its value because of circumstances [Ross] |
| 5921 | We can ask of pleasure or beauty whether they are valuable, but not of goodness [Ross] |
| 5932 | The four goods are: virtue, pleasure, just allocation of pleasure, and knowledge [Ross] |
| 5910 | The three intrinsic goods are virtue, knowledge and pleasure [Ross] |
| 5898 | 'Right' and 'good' differ in meaning, as in a 'right action' and a 'good man' [Ross] |
| 5899 | If there are two equally good acts, they may both be right, but neither a duty [Ross] |
| 5904 | In the past 'right' just meant what is conventionally accepted [Ross] |
| 5919 | Goodness is a wider concept than just correct ethical conduct [Ross] |
| 5941 | Motives decide whether an action is good, and what is done decides whether it was right [Ross] |
| 5938 | Virtue is superior to pleasure, as pleasure is never a duty, but goodness is [Ross] |
| 5931 | All other things being equal, a universe with more understanding is better [Ross] |
| 5939 | Morality is not entirely social; a good moral character should love truth [Ross] |
| 5905 | We clearly value good character or understanding, as well as pleasure [Ross] |
| 5929 | No one thinks it doesn't matter whether pleasure is virtuously or viciously acquired [Ross] |
| 5906 | Promise-keeping is bound by the past, and is not concerned with consequences [Ross] |
| 18622 | Promises create a new duty to a particular person; they aren't just a strategy to achieve well-being [Ross] |
| 5908 | Prima facie duties rest self-evidently on particular circumstance [Ross] |
| 5917 | People lose their rights if they do not respect the rights of others [Ross] |
| 5900 | We should do our duty, but not from a sense of duty [Ross] |
| 5942 | We like people who act from love, but admire more the people who act from duty [Ross] |
| 5909 | Be faithful, grateful, just, beneficent, non-malevolent, and improve yourself [Ross, by PG] |
| 5914 | An act may be described in innumerable ways [Ross] |
| 5912 | We should use money to pay debts before giving to charity [Ross] |
| 5916 | Rights were originally legal, and broadened to include other things [Ross] |
| 5915 | Rights can be justly claimed, so animals have no rights, as they cannot claim any [Ross] |