204 ideas
16395 | Kripke separated semantics from metaphysics, rather than linking them, making the latter independent [Kripke, by Stalnaker] |
14122 | Analysis gives us nothing but the truth - but never the whole truth [Russell] |
17034 | Analyses of concepts using entirely different terms are very inclined to fail [Kripke] |
14109 | The study of grammar is underestimated in philosophy [Russell] |
14165 | Analysis falsifies, if when the parts are broken down they are not equivalent to their sum [Russell] |
4955 | Some definitions aim to fix a reference rather than give a meaning [Kripke] |
14115 | Definition by analysis into constituents is useless, because it neglects the whole [Russell] |
14159 | In mathematics definitions are superfluous, as they name classes, and it all reduces to primitives [Russell] |
14148 | Infinite regresses have propositions made of propositions etc, with the key term reappearing [Russell] |
18002 | As well as a truth value, propositions have a range of significance for their variables [Russell] |
14102 | What is true or false is not mental, and is best called 'propositions' [Russell] |
14176 | "The death of Caesar is true" is not the same proposition as "Caesar died" [Russell] |
10559 | Kripke's modal semantics presupposes certain facts about possible worlds [Kripke, by Zalta] |
14113 | The null class is a fiction [Russell] |
15894 | Russell invented the naïve set theory usually attributed to Cantor [Russell, by Lavine] |
14126 | Order rests on 'between' and 'separation' [Russell] |
14127 | Order depends on transitive asymmetrical relations [Russell] |
14121 | The part-whole relation is ultimate and indefinable [Russell] |
14106 | Implication cannot be defined [Russell] |
14108 | It would be circular to use 'if' and 'then' to define material implication [Russell] |
14167 | The only classes are things, predicates and relations [Russell] |
14105 | There seem to be eight or nine logical constants [Russell] |
18722 | Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
14104 | Constants are absolutely definite and unambiguous [Russell] |
14114 | Variables don't stand alone, but exist as parts of propositional functions [Russell] |
10437 | Names are rigid, making them unlike definite descriptions [Kripke, by Sainsbury] |
4949 | Names are rigid designators, which designate the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
4951 | A bundle of qualities is a collection of abstractions, so it can't be a particular [Kripke] |
17031 | A name can still refer even if it satisfies none of its well-known descriptions [Kripke] |
8957 | Some references, such as 'Neptune', have to be fixed by description rather than baptism [Kripke, by Szabó] |
10428 | Proper names must have referents, because they are not descriptive [Kripke, by Sainsbury] |
4959 | A name's reference is not fixed by any marks or properties of the referent [Kripke] |
14137 | 'Any' is better than 'all' where infinite classes are concerned [Russell] |
14149 | The Achilles Paradox concerns the one-one correlation of infinite classes [Russell] |
15895 | Russell discovered the paradox suggested by Burali-Forti's work [Russell, by Lavine] |
14152 | In geometry, Kant and idealists aimed at the certainty of the premisses [Russell] |
14154 | Geometry throws no light on the nature of actual space [Russell] |
14151 | Pure geometry is deductive, and neutral over what exists [Russell] |
14153 | In geometry, empiricists aimed at premisses consistent with experience [Russell] |
14155 | Two points have a line joining them (descriptive), a distance (metrical), and a whole line (projective) [Russell, by PG] |
18254 | Russell's approach had to treat real 5/8 as different from rational 5/8 [Russell, by Dummett] |
14144 | Ordinals result from likeness among relations, as cardinals from similarity among classes [Russell] |
14128 | Some claim priority for the ordinals over cardinals, but there is no logical priority between them [Russell] |
14129 | Ordinals presuppose two relations, where cardinals only presuppose one [Russell] |
14132 | Properties of numbers don't rely on progressions, so cardinals may be more basic [Russell] |
14141 | Ordinals are defined through mathematical induction [Russell] |
14142 | Ordinals are types of series of terms in a row, rather than the 'nth' instance [Russell] |
14139 | Transfinite ordinals don't obey commutativity, so their arithmetic is quite different from basic arithmetic [Russell] |
14145 | For Cantor ordinals are types of order, not numbers [Russell] |
14146 | We aren't sure if one cardinal number is always bigger than another [Russell] |
14135 | Real numbers are a class of rational numbers (and so not really numbers at all) [Russell] |
14123 | Some quantities can't be measured, and some non-quantities are measurable [Russell] |
14158 | Quantity is not part of mathematics, where it is replaced by order [Russell] |
14120 | Counting explains none of the real problems about the foundations of arithmetic [Russell] |
14118 | We can define one-to-one without mentioning unity [Russell] |
14119 | We do not currently know whether, of two infinite numbers, one must be greater than the other [Russell] |
14133 | There are cardinal and ordinal theories of infinity (while continuity is entirely ordinal) [Russell] |
14134 | Infinite numbers are distinguished by disobeying induction, and the part equalling the whole [Russell] |
14143 | ω names the whole series, or the generating relation of the series of ordinal numbers [Russell] |
14138 | You can't get a new transfinite cardinal from an old one just by adding finite numbers to it [Russell] |
14140 | For every transfinite cardinal there is an infinite collection of transfinite ordinals [Russell] |
14124 | Axiom of Archimedes: a finite multiple of a lesser magnitude can always exceed a greater [Russell] |
7530 | Russell tried to replace Peano's Postulates with the simple idea of 'class' [Russell, by Monk] |
18246 | Dedekind failed to distinguish the numbers from other progressions [Shapiro on Russell] |
14147 | Denying mathematical induction gave us the transfinite [Russell] |
14125 | Finite numbers, unlike infinite numbers, obey mathematical induction [Russell] |
14116 | Numbers were once defined on the basis of 1, but neglected infinities and + [Russell] |
14117 | Numbers are properties of classes [Russell] |
9977 | Ordinals can't be defined just by progression; they have intrinsic qualities [Russell] |
14162 | Mathematics doesn't care whether its entities exist [Russell] |
14103 | Pure mathematics is the class of propositions of the form 'p implies q' [Russell] |
21555 | For 'x is a u' to be meaningful, u must be one range of individuals (or 'type') higher than x [Russell] |
18003 | In 'x is a u', x and u must be of different types, so 'x is an x' is generally meaningless [Russell, by Magidor] |
11010 | Being is what belongs to every possible object of thought [Russell] |
14161 | Many things have being (as topics of propositions), but may not have actual existence [Russell] |
14173 | What exists has causal relations, but non-existent things may also have them [Russell] |
14896 | Kripke's metaphysics (essences, kinds, rigidity) blocks the slide into sociology [Kripke, by Ladyman/Ross] |
14163 | Four classes of terms: instants, points, terms at instants only, and terms at instants and points [Russell] |
21341 | Philosophers of logic and maths insisted that a vocabulary of relations was essential [Russell, by Heil] |
10586 | 'Reflexiveness' holds between a term and itself, and cannot be inferred from symmetry and transitiveness [Russell] |
10585 | Symmetrical and transitive relations are formally like equality [Russell] |
7781 | I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence. [Russell] |
14166 | Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity [Russell] |
17647 | Kripke individuates objects by essential modal properties (and presupposes essentialism) [Kripke, by Putnam] |
14164 | The only unities are simples, or wholes composed of parts [Russell] |
14112 | A set has some sort of unity, but not enough to be a 'whole' [Russell] |
16995 | Given that a table is made of molecules, could it not be molecular and still be this table? [Kripke] |
17047 | If we imagine this table made of ice or different wood, we are imagining a different table [Kripke] |
5450 | For Kripke, essence is origin; for Putnam, essence is properties; for Wiggins, essence is membership of a kind [Kripke, by Mautner] |
17055 | Atomic number 79 is part of the nature of the gold we know [Kripke] |
16997 | An essential property is true of an object in any case where it would have existed [Kripke] |
17045 | De re modality is an object having essential properties [Kripke] |
17030 | Important properties of an object need not be essential to it [Kripke] |
16955 | Kripke says internal structure fixes species; I say it is genetic affinity and a common descent [Kripke, by Dummett] |
16996 | Given that Nixon is indeed a human being, that he might not have been does not concern knowledge [Kripke] |
13971 | Kripke claims that some properties, only knowable posteriori, are known a priori to be essential [Kripke, by Soames] |
12100 | An essence is the necessary properties, derived from an intuitive identity, in origin, type and material [Kripke, by Witt] |
14170 | Change is obscured by substance, a thing's nature, subject-predicate form, and by essences [Russell] |
16991 | No one seems to know the identity conditions for a material object (or for people) over time [Kripke] |
11867 | If we lose track of origin, how do we show we are maintaining a reference? [Kripke, by Wiggins] |
12018 | Kripke argues, of the Queen, that parents of an organism are essentially so [Kripke, by Forbes,G] |
17046 | Could the actual Queen have been born of different parents? [Kripke] |
8274 | Socrates can't have a necessary origin, because he might have had no 'origin' [Lowe on Kripke] |
17036 | Identity statements can be contingent if they rely on descriptions [Kripke] |
17038 | If Hesperus and Phosophorus are the same, they can't possibly be different [Kripke] |
14107 | Terms are identical if they belong to all the same classes [Russell] |
11849 | It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
11880 | Kripke says his necessary a posteriori examples are known a priori to be necessary [Kripke, by Mackie,P] |
4797 | Instead of being regularities, maybe natural laws are the weak a posteriori necessities of Kripke [Kripke, by Psillos] |
17037 | Physical necessity may be necessity in the highest degree [Kripke] |
22303 | It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false [Russell] |
4728 | Kripke separates necessary and a priori, proposing necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori examples [Kripke, by O'Grady] |
16990 | A priori = Necessary because we imagine all worlds, and we know without looking at actuality? [Kripke] |
9386 | The meter is defined necessarily, but the stick being one meter long is contingent a priori [Kripke] |
4960 | "'Hesperus' is 'Phosphorus'" is necessarily true, if it is true, but not known a priori [Kripke] |
4966 | Theoretical identities are between rigid designators, and so are necessary a posteriori [Kripke] |
2408 | Kripke has demonstrated that some necessary truths are only knowable a posteriori [Kripke, by Chalmers] |
13967 | Kripke's essentialist necessary a posteriori opened the gap between conceivable and really possible [Soames on Kripke] |
13970 | Kripke gets to the necessary a posteriori by only allowing conceivability when combined with actuality [Kripke, by Soames] |
16992 | Possible worlds aren't puzzling places to learn about, but places we ourselves describe [Kripke] |
16993 | If we discuss what might have happened to Nixon, we stipulate that it is about Nixon [Kripke] |
16998 | Transworld identification is unproblematic, because we stipulate that we rigidly refer to something [Kripke] |
17001 | A table in some possible world should not even be identified by its essential properties [Kripke] |
4952 | Identification across possible worlds does not need properties, even essential ones [Kripke] |
7761 | Test for rigidity by inserting into the sentence 'N might not have been N' [Kripke, by Lycan] |
7693 | Kripke avoids difficulties of transworld identity by saying it is a decision, not a discovery [Kripke, by Jacquette] |
5821 | Saying that natural kinds are 'rigid designators' is the same as saying they are 'indexical' [Kripke, by Putnam] |
14068 | If Kripke names must still denote a thing in a non-actual situation, the statue isn't its clay [Gibbard on Kripke] |
10436 | A rigid expression may refer at a world to an object not existing in that world [Kripke, by Sainsbury] |
4953 | We do not begin with possible worlds and place objects in them; we begin with objects in the real world [Kripke] |
4961 | It is a necessary truth that Elizabeth II was the child of two particular parents [Kripke] |
16986 | That there might have been unicorns is false; we don't know the circumstances for unicorns [Kripke] |
8259 | Kripke has breathed new life into the a priori/a posteriori distinction [Kripke, by Lowe] |
16989 | Rather than 'a priori truth', it is best to stick to whether some person knows it on a priori evidence [Kripke] |
4947 | A priori truths can be known independently of experience - but they don't have to be [Kripke] |
13975 | Kripke was more successful in illuminating necessity than a priority (and their relations to analyticity) [Kripke, by Soames] |
17048 | Analytic judgements are a priori, even when their content is empirical [Kripke] |
4948 | Intuition is the strongest possible evidence one can have about anything [Kripke] |
4958 | Identities like 'heat is molecule motion' are necessary (in the highest degree), not contingent [Kripke] |
4967 | It seems logically possible to have the pain brain state without the actual pain [Kripke] |
7430 | Kripke assumes that mind-brain identity designates rigidly, which it doesn't [Armstrong on Kripke] |
7867 | If consciousness could separate from brain, then it cannot be identical with brain [Kripke, by Papineau] |
3228 | Kripke says pain is necessarily pain, but a brain state isn't necessarily painful [Kripke, by Rey] |
5832 | Identity must be necessary, but pain isn't necessarily a brain state, so they aren't identical [Kripke, by Schwartz,SP] |
4968 | Identity theorists seem committed to no-brain-event-no-pain, and vice versa, which seems wrong [Kripke] |
10583 | Abstraction principles identify a common property, which is some third term with the right relation [Russell] |
10582 | The principle of Abstraction says a symmetrical, transitive relation analyses into an identity [Russell] |
10584 | A certain type of property occurs if and only if there is an equivalence relation [Russell] |
17874 | Kripke has a definitional account of kinds, but not of naming [Almog on Kripke] |
16394 | Kripke derives accounts of reference and proper names from assumptions about worlds and essences [Stalnaker on Kripke] |
5822 | The important cause is not between dubbing and current use, but between the item and the speaker's information [Evans on Kripke] |
17033 | We may refer through a causal chain, but still change what is referred to [Kripke] |
4689 | Kripke makes reference a largely social matter, external to the mind of the speaker [Kripke, by McGinn] |
17504 | Kripke's theory is important because it gives a collective account of reference [Kripke, by Putnam] |
17035 | We refer through the community, going back to the original referent [Kripke] |
16988 | Descriptive reference shows how to refer, how to identify two things, and how to challenge existence [Kripke, by PG] |
17029 | It can't be necessary that Aristotle had the properties commonly attributed to him [Kripke] |
14893 | Rigid designation creates a puzzle - why do some necessary truths appear to be contingent? [Kripke, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
14110 | Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves [Russell] |
19164 | If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell] |
14111 | A proposition is a unity, and analysis destroys it [Russell] |
19157 | Russell said the proposition must explain its own unity - or else objective truth is impossible [Russell, by Davidson] |
23369 | Some liberals thinks checks and balances are enough, without virtuous citizens [Kymlicka] |
23370 | Good citizens need civic virtues of loyalty, independence, diligence, respect, etc. [Kymlicka] |
23373 | Liberals accept that people need society, but Aristotelians must show that they need political activity [Kymlicka] |
23375 | Minimal liberal citizenship needs common civility, as well as mere non-interference [Kymlicka] |
23376 | Modern non-discrimination obliges modern citizens to treat each other as equals [Kymlicka] |
23377 | The right wing sees citizenship in terms of responsibility to earn a living, rather than rights [Kymlicka] |
23371 | Modern democratic theory focuses on talk, not votes, because we need consensus or compromise [Kymlicka] |
23390 | In a liberal democracy all subjects of authority have a right to determine the authority [Kymlicka] |
23374 | We have become attached to private life because that has become greatly enriched [Kymlicka] |
23387 | Liberals must avoid an official culture, as well as an official religion [Kymlicka] |
23388 | Liberals need more than freedom; they must build a nation, through a language and institutions [Kymlicka] |
23380 | Some individuals can gain citizenship as part of a group, rather than as mere individuals [Kymlicka] |
23381 | The status hierarchy is independent of the economic hierarchy [Kymlicka] |
23383 | Some multiculturalists defended the rights of cohesive minorities against liberal individualism [Kymlicka] |
23384 | 'Culturalist' liberals say that even liberal individuals may need minority rights [Kymlicka] |
23385 | Multiculturalism may entail men dominating women in minority groups [Kymlicka] |
23386 | Liberals must prefer minority right which are freedoms, not restrictions [Kymlicka] |
23389 | Why shouldn't national minorities have their own right to nation-build? [Kymlicka] |
23391 | Multiculturalism is liberal if it challenges inequality, conservative if it emphasises common good [Kymlicka] |
23379 | Rights are a part of nation-building, to build a common national identity and culture [Kymlicka] |
23382 | Rights derived from group membership are opposed to the idea of state citizenship [Kymlicka] |
23378 | The welfare state helps to integrate the working classes into a national culture [Kymlicka] |
17056 | Terms for natural kinds are very close to proper names [Kripke] |
4963 | The properties that fix reference are contingent, the properties involving meaning are necessary [Kripke] |
17053 | Gold's atomic number might not be 79, but if it is, could non-79 stuff be gold? [Kripke] |
4964 | 'Cats are animals' has turned out to be a necessary truth [Kripke] |
6765 | Nominal essence may well be neither necessary nor sufficient for a natural kind [Kripke, by Bird] |
14175 | We can drop 'cause', and just make inferences between facts [Russell] |
14172 | Moments and points seem to imply other moments and points, but don't cause them [Russell] |
9387 | The scientific discovery (if correct) that gold has atomic number 79 is a necessary truth [Kripke] |
17054 | Scientific discoveries about gold are necessary truths [Kripke] |
17057 | Once we've found that heat is molecular motion, then that's what it is, in all possible worlds [Kripke] |
4965 | Science searches basic structures in search of essences [Kripke] |
14174 | The laws of motion and gravitation are just parts of the definition of a kind of matter [Russell] |
14168 | Occupying a place and change are prior to motion, so motion is just occupying places at continuous times [Russell] |
14171 | Force is supposed to cause acceleration, but acceleration is a mathematical fiction [Russell] |
14160 | Space is the extension of 'point', and aggregates of points seem necessary for geometry [Russell] |
14156 | Mathematicians don't distinguish between instants of time and points on a line [Russell] |
14169 | The 'universe' can mean what exists now, what always has or will exist [Russell] |
17050 | Tigers may lack all the properties we originally used to identify them [Kripke] |
17051 | The original concept of 'cat' comes from paradigmatic instances [Kripke] |
17049 | 'Tiger' designates a species, and merely looking like the species is not enough [Kripke] |