Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Propositions: What they are,and Meaning', 'The Trouble with Possible Worlds' and 'A Theory of Universals'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
15787 Maybe Ockham's Razor is a purely aesthetic principle [Lycan]
15784 The Razor seems irrelevant for Meinongians, who allow absolutely everything to exist [Lycan]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
5784 In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
5777 The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
5783 Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
15544 If what is actual might have been impossible, we need S4 modal logic [Armstrong, by Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
7024 Properties are universals, which are always instantiated [Armstrong, by Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
9478 Even if all properties are categorical, they may be denoted by dispositional predicates [Armstrong, by Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
10729 Universals explain resemblance and causal power [Armstrong, by Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
4031 It doesn't follow that because there is a predicate there must therefore exist a property [Armstrong]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
15792 Maybe non-existent objects are sets of properties [Lycan]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
10024 The type-token distinction is the universal-particular distinction [Armstrong, by Hodes]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
10728 A thing's self-identity can't be a universal, since we can know it a priori [Armstrong, by Oliver]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
15795 Treating possible worlds as mental needs more actual mental events [Lycan]
15796 Possible worlds must be made of intensional objects like propositions or properties [Lycan]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / c. Worlds as propositions
15794 If 'worlds' are sentences, and possibility their consistency, consistency may rely on possibility [Lycan]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
5780 The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
5778 If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
5779 There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
5776 A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell]
5781 Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell]
5782 A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell]