8 ideas
5691 | The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly' [Shoemaker] |
8875 | Sense experiences must have conceptual content, since they are possible reasons for judgements [Brewer,B] |
5687 | For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker] |
5688 | Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker] |
5504 | Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi] |
5503 | Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi] |
5502 | Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi] |
5505 | For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi] |