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All the ideas for 'works', 'Politics' and 'The Principles of Mathematics'

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208 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
Free and great-souled men do not keep asking "what is the use of it?" [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
Analysis gives us nothing but the truth - but never the whole truth [Russell]
Our method of inquiry is to examine the smallest parts that make up the whole [Aristotle]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
The study of grammar is underestimated in philosophy [Russell]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analysis falsifies, if when the parts are broken down they are not equivalent to their sum [Russell]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
Human beings, alone of the animals, have logos [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reasoning distinguishes what is beneficial, and hence what is right [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 7. Status of Reason
Intelligence which looks ahead is a natural master, while bodily strength is a natural slave [Aristotle]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 13. Against Definition
Definition by analysis into constituents is useless, because it neglects the whole [Russell]
In mathematics definitions are superfluous, as they name classes, and it all reduces to primitives [Russell]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 2. Infinite Regress
Infinite regresses have propositions made of propositions etc, with the key term reappearing [Russell]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 3. Question Begging
Men are natural leaders (apart from the unnatural ones) [Aristotle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
'If each is small, so too are all' is in one way false, for the whole composed of all is not small [Aristotle]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 8. Category Mistake / a. Category mistakes
As well as a truth value, propositions have a range of significance for their variables [Russell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
What is true or false is not mental, and is best called 'propositions' [Russell]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
"The death of Caesar is true" is not the same proposition as "Caesar died" [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
The null class is a fiction [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / d. Naïve logical sets
Russell invented the naïve set theory usually attributed to Cantor [Russell, by Lavine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
Order rests on 'between' and 'separation' [Russell]
Order depends on transitive asymmetrical relations [Russell]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
The part-whole relation is ultimate and indefinable [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
Implication cannot be defined [Russell]
It would be circular to use 'if' and 'then' to define material implication [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
The only classes are things, predicates and relations [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor lack of contradiction a sign of truth [Pascal]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / b. Basic connectives
There seem to be eight or nine logical constants [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation [Wittgenstein on Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 3. Constants in Logic
Constants are absolutely definite and unambiguous [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
Variables don't stand alone, but exist as parts of propositional functions [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
'Any' is better than 'all' where infinite classes are concerned [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
The Achilles Paradox concerns the one-one correlation of infinite classes [Russell]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
Russell discovered the paradox suggested by Burali-Forti's work [Russell, by Lavine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
In geometry, Kant and idealists aimed at the certainty of the premisses [Russell]
Geometry throws no light on the nature of actual space [Russell]
Pure geometry is deductive, and neutral over what exists [Russell]
In geometry, empiricists aimed at premisses consistent with experience [Russell]
Two points have a line joining them (descriptive), a distance (metrical), and a whole line (projective) [Russell, by PG]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Russell's approach had to treat real 5/8 as different from rational 5/8 [Russell, by Dummett]
Ordinals result from likeness among relations, as cardinals from similarity among classes [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Some claim priority for the ordinals over cardinals, but there is no logical priority between them [Russell]
Ordinals presuppose two relations, where cardinals only presuppose one [Russell]
Properties of numbers don't rely on progressions, so cardinals may be more basic [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Ordinals are defined through mathematical induction [Russell]
Ordinals are types of series of terms in a row, rather than the 'nth' instance [Russell]
Transfinite ordinals don't obey commutativity, so their arithmetic is quite different from basic arithmetic [Russell]
For Cantor ordinals are types of order, not numbers [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
We aren't sure if one cardinal number is always bigger than another [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Real numbers are a class of rational numbers (and so not really numbers at all) [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / b. Quantity
Some quantities can't be measured, and some non-quantities are measurable [Russell]
Quantity is not part of mathematics, where it is replaced by order [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Counting explains none of the real problems about the foundations of arithmetic [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
We can define one-to-one without mentioning unity [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
We do not currently know whether, of two infinite numbers, one must be greater than the other [Russell]
There are cardinal and ordinal theories of infinity (while continuity is entirely ordinal) [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / b. Mark of the infinite
Infinite numbers are distinguished by disobeying induction, and the part equalling the whole [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / h. Ordinal infinity
ω names the whole series, or the generating relation of the series of ordinal numbers [Russell]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / i. Cardinal infinity
You can't get a new transfinite cardinal from an old one just by adding finite numbers to it [Russell]
For every transfinite cardinal there is an infinite collection of transfinite ordinals [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
Axiom of Archimedes: a finite multiple of a lesser magnitude can always exceed a greater [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
Russell tried to replace Peano's Postulates with the simple idea of 'class' [Russell, by Monk]
Dedekind failed to distinguish the numbers from other progressions [Shapiro on Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / f. Mathematical induction
Denying mathematical induction gave us the transfinite [Russell]
Finite numbers, unlike infinite numbers, obey mathematical induction [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / b. Greek arithmetic
Numbers were once defined on the basis of 1, but neglected infinities and + [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / c. Fregean numbers
Numbers are properties of classes [Russell]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
Ordinals can't be defined just by progression; they have intrinsic qualities [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
Mathematics doesn't care whether its entities exist [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
Pure mathematics is the class of propositions of the form 'p implies q' [Russell]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
For 'x is a u' to be meaningful, u must be one range of individuals (or 'type') higher than x [Russell]
In 'x is a u', x and u must be of different types, so 'x is an x' is generally meaningless [Russell, by Magidor]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Being is what belongs to every possible object of thought [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / b. Being and existence
Many things have being (as topics of propositions), but may not have actual existence [Russell]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
What exists has causal relations, but non-existent things may also have them [Russell]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
Four classes of terms: instants, points, terms at instants only, and terms at instants and points [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
Philosophers of logic and maths insisted that a vocabulary of relations was essential [Russell, by Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
'Reflexiveness' holds between a term and itself, and cannot be inferred from symmetry and transitiveness [Russell]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / b. Equivalence relation
Symmetrical and transitive relations are formally like equality [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought
I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence. [Russell]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / a. Intrinsic unification
The only unities are simples, or wholes composed of parts [Russell]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
A set has some sort of unity, but not enough to be a 'whole' [Russell]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
The whole is prior to its parts, because parts are defined by their role [Aristotle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Change is obscured by substance, a thing's nature, subject-predicate form, and by essences [Russell]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Terms are identical if they belong to all the same classes [Russell]
It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common [Wittgenstein on Russell]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false [Russell]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Understanding is the aim of our nature [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
To grasp something, trace it back to its natural origins [Aristotle]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
The nature of each thing is its mature state [Aristotle]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The nature of all animate things is to have one part which rules it [Aristotle]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstraction principles identify a common property, which is some third term with the right relation [Russell]
The principle of Abstraction says a symmetrical, transitive relation analyses into an identity [Russell]
A certain type of property occurs if and only if there is an equivalence relation [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves [Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 5. Unity of Propositions
A proposition is a unity, and analysis destroys it [Russell]
Russell said the proposition must explain its own unity - or else objective truth is impossible [Russell, by Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Rhetoric now enables good speakers to become popular leaders [Aristotle]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
A community can lack self-control [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 5. Natural Beauty
Nothing contrary to nature is beautiful [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 5. Objectivism in Art
The collective judgement of many people on art is better than that of an individual [Aristotle]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Music can mould the character to be virtuous (just as gymnastics trains the body) [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
Some say slavery is unnatural and created by convention, and is therefore forced, and unjust [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Spirit [thumos] is the capacity by which we love [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Selfishness is wrong not because it is self-love, but because it is excessive [Aristotle]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
The function of good men is to confer benefits [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtuous people are like the citizens of the best city [Aristotle]
People become good because of nature, habit and reason [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / f. The Mean
The law is the mean [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / h. Right feelings
Virtue is concerned with correct feelings [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
It is quite possible to live a moderate life and yet be miserable [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Justice is a virtue of communities [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
The rich are seen as noble, because they don't need to commit crimes [Aristotle]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
Master and slave can have friendship through common interests [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / a. Human distinctiveness
Man is by nature a political animal [Aristotle]
People want to live together, even when they don't want mutual help [Aristotle]
Only humans have reason [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The community (of villages) becomes a city when it is totally self-sufficient [Aristotle]
A community must share a common view of good and justice [Aristotle]
People who are anti-social or wholly self-sufficient are no part of a city [Aristotle]
Friendship is the best good for cities, because it reduces factions [Aristotle]
A city can't become entirely one, because its very nature is to be a multitude [Aristotle]
A community should all share to some extent in something like land or food [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / b. State population
The size of a city is decided by the maximum self-sufficient community that can be surveyed [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
A city aims at living well [Aristotle]
What is the best life for everyone, and is that a communal or an individual problem? [Aristotle]
The same four cardinal virtues which apply to individuals also apply to a city [Aristotle]
Every state is an association formed for some good purpose [Aristotle]
The happiest city is the one that acts most nobly [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
The state aims to consist as far as possible of those who are like and equal [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
The six constitutions are monarchy/tyranny, aristocracy/oligarchy, and polity/democracy [Aristotle]
A city is a community of free people, and the constitution should aim at the common advantage [Aristotle]
Any constitution can be made to last for a day or two [Aristotle]
The best constitution enables everyone to live the best life [Aristotle]
Constitutions specify distribution of offices, the authorities, and the community's aim [Aristotle]
The greed of the rich is more destructive than the greed of the people [Aristotle]
We must decide the most desirable human life before designing a constitution [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 4. Citizenship
The middle classes are neither ambitious nor anarchic, which is good [Aristotle]
The virtues of a good citizen are relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle]
A person can be an excellent citizen without being an excellent man [Aristotle]
A citizen is someone who is allowed to hold official posts in a city [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / b. Monarchy
Kings should be selected according to character [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
The only virtue special to a ruler is practical wisdom [Aristotle]
People who buy public office will probably expect to profit from it [Aristotle]
The rich can claim to rule, because of land ownership, and being more trustworthy [Aristotle]
The guardians should not be harsh to strangers, as no one should behave like that [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / c. Executive
In large communities it is better if more people participate in the offices [Aristotle]
Election of officials by the elected is dangerous, because factions can control it [Aristotle]
Officers should like the constitution, be capable, and have appropriate virtues and justice [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Like water, large numbers of people are harder to corrupt than a few [Aristotle]
Democracy arises when people who are given equal freedom assume unconditional equality [Aristotle]
Popular leaders only arise in democracies that are not in accord with the law [Aristotle]
Choosing officials by lot is democratic [Aristotle]
The many may add up to something good, even if they are inferior as individuals [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / d. Representative democracy
If the people are equal in nature, then they should all share in ruling [Aristotle]
It is wrong that a worthy officer of state should seek the office [Aristotle]
No office is permanent in a democracy [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
In many cases, the claim that the majority is superior would apply equally to wild beasts [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / f. Against democracy
Ultimate democracy is tyranny [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / e. Liberal community
We aim to understand the best possible community for free people [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Community is based on friends, who are equal and similar, and share things [Aristotle]
Look at all of the citizens before judging a city to be happy [Aristotle]
The best communities rely on a large and strong middle class [Aristotle]
Citizens do not just own themselves, but are also parts of the city [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 8. Socialism
People care less about what is communal, and more about what is their own [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
Owning and sharing property communally increases disagreements [Aristotle]
There could be private land and public crops, or public land and private crops, or both public [Aristotle]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 12. Feminism
Both women and children should be educated, as this contributes to a city's excellence [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 1. Slavery
Natural slaves are those naturally belonging to another, or who can manage no more than labouring [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 6. Political freedom
One principle of liberty is to take turns ruling and being ruled [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Equality is obviously there to help people who do not get priority in the constitution [Aristotle]
It is always the weak who want justice and equality, not the strong [Aristotle]
We can claim an equal right to aristocratic virtue, as well as to wealth or freedom [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
The Heraeans replaced election with lot, to thwart campaigning [Aristotle]
It is dreadful to neither give a share nor receive a share [Aristotle]
Faction is for inferiors to be equal, and equals to become superior [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
Phaleas proposed equality of property, provided there is equality of education [Aristotle]
Wealth could be quickly leveled by only the rich giving marriage dowries [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Law is intelligence without appetite [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Property should be owned privately, but used communally [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
The virtue of justice may be relative to a particular constitution [Aristotle]
Justice is the order in a political community [Aristotle]
Justice is equality for equals, and inequality for unequals [Aristotle]
The good is obviously justice, which benefits the whole community, and involves equality in some sense [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
If it is easy to change the laws, that makes them weaker [Aristotle]
Man is the worst of all animals when divorced from law and justice [Aristotle]
Laws that match people's habits are more effective than mere written rules [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / b. Rule of law
It is preferable that law should rule rather than any single citizen [Aristotle]
Correct law should be in control, with rulers only deciding uncertain issues [Aristotle]
It is said that we should not stick strictly to written law, as it is too vague [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 2. Religion in Society
The whole state should pay for the worship of the gods [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
A state is plural, and needs education to make it a community [Aristotle]
A city has a single end, so education must focus on that, and be communal, not private [Aristotle]
The aim of serious childhood play is the amusement of the complete adult [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Men learn partly by habit, and partly by listening [Aristotle]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Abortions should be procured before the embryo has acquired life and sensation [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
If nature makes everything for a purpose, then plants and animals must have been made for man [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
The best instruments have one purpose, not many [Aristotle]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
We can drop 'cause', and just make inferences between facts [Russell]
Moments and points seem to imply other moments and points, but don't cause them [Russell]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The laws of motion and gravitation are just parts of the definition of a kind of matter [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Occupying a place and change are prior to motion, so motion is just occupying places at continuous times [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
Force is supposed to cause acceleration, but acceleration is a mathematical fiction [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Space is the extension of 'point', and aggregates of points seem necessary for geometry [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / b. Instants
Mathematicians don't distinguish between instants of time and points on a line [Russell]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 1. Cosmology
The 'universe' can mean what exists now, what always has or will exist [Russell]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
God is not blessed and happy because of external goods, but because of his own nature [Aristotle]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
Men imagine gods to be of human shape, with a human lifestyle [Aristotle]