38 ideas
6675 | The heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing [Pascal] |
10775 | The axiom of choice now seems acceptable and obvious (if it is meaningful) [Tharp] |
10766 | Logic is either for demonstration, or for characterizing structures [Tharp] |
10767 | Elementary logic is complete, but cannot capture mathematics [Tharp] |
10769 | Second-order logic isn't provable, but will express set-theory and classic problems [Tharp] |
10762 | In sentential logic there is a simple proof that all truth functions can be reduced to 'not' and 'and' [Tharp] |
10776 | The main quantifiers extend 'and' and 'or' to infinite domains [Tharp] |
10774 | There are at least five unorthodox quantifiers that could be used [Tharp] |
10777 | Skolem mistakenly inferred that Cantor's conceptions were illusory [Tharp] |
10773 | The Löwenheim-Skolem property is a limitation (e.g. can't say there are uncountably many reals) [Tharp] |
10765 | Soundness would seem to be an essential requirement of a proof procedure [Tharp] |
10763 | Completeness and compactness together give axiomatizability [Tharp] |
10770 | If completeness fails there is no algorithm to list the valid formulas [Tharp] |
10771 | Compactness is important for major theories which have infinitely many axioms [Tharp] |
10772 | Compactness blocks infinite expansion, and admits non-standard models [Tharp] |
10764 | A complete logic has an effective enumeration of the valid formulas [Tharp] |
10768 | Effective enumeration might be proved but not specified, so it won't guarantee knowledge [Tharp] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
22011 | The first principles of truth are not rational, but are known by the heart [Pascal] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
6681 | We only want to know things so that we can talk about them [Pascal] |
6676 | Painting makes us admire things of which we do not admire the originals [Pascal] |
6680 | It is a funny sort of justice whose limits are marked by a river [Pascal] |
6677 | Imagination creates beauty, justice and happiness, which is the supreme good [Pascal] |
6678 | We live for the past or future, and so are never happy in the present [Pascal] |
20732 | If man considers himself as lost and imprisoned in the universe, he will be terrified [Pascal] |
6682 | Majority opinion is visible and authoritative, although not very clever [Pascal] |
6679 | It is not good to be too free [Pascal] |
7455 | Pascal knows you can't force belief, but you can make it much more probable [Pascal, by Hacking] |
7457 | Pascal is right, but relies on the unsupported claim of a half as the chance of God's existence [Hacking on Pascal] |
7456 | The libertine would lose a life of enjoyable sin if he chose the cloisters [Hacking on Pascal] |
6684 | If you win the wager on God's existence you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing [Pascal] |