44 ideas
| 9542 | The best known axiomatization of PL is Whitehead/Russell, with four axioms and two rules [Russell/Whitehead, by Hughes/Cresswell] |
| 21720 | Russell saw Reducibility as legitimate for reducing classes to logic [Linsky,B on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 10044 | Russell denies extensional sets, because the null can't be a collection, and the singleton is just its element [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
| 18208 | We regard classes as mere symbolic or linguistic conveniences [Russell/Whitehead] |
| 8204 | Lewis's 'strict implication' preserved Russell's confusion of 'if...then' with implication [Quine on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 9359 | Russell's implication means that random sentences imply one another [Lewis,CI on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 21707 | Russell unusually saw logic as 'interpreted' (though very general, and neutral) [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
| 10121 | Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor lack of contradiction a sign of truth [Pascal] |
| 10036 | In 'Principia' a new abstract theory of relations appeared, and was applied [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel] |
| 18248 | A real number is the class of rationals less than the number [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
| 18152 | Russell takes numbers to be classes, but then reduces the classes to numerical quantifiers [Russell/Whitehead, by Bostock] |
| 10025 | Russell and Whitehead took arithmetic to be higher-order logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Hodes] |
| 8683 | Russell and Whitehead were not realists, but embraced nearly all of maths in logic [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend] |
| 10037 | 'Principia' lacks a precise statement of the syntax [Gödel on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 10093 | The ramified theory of types used propositional functions, and covered bound variables [Russell/Whitehead, by George/Velleman] |
| 8691 | The Russell/Whitehead type theory was limited, and was not really logic [Friend on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 10305 | In 'Principia Mathematica', logic is exceeded in the axioms of infinity and reducibility, and in the domains [Bernays on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 8684 | Russell and Whitehead consider the paradoxes to indicate that we create mathematical reality [Russell/Whitehead, by Friend] |
| 8746 | To avoid vicious circularity Russell produced ramified type theory, but Ramsey simplified it [Russell/Whitehead, by Shapiro] |
| 12033 | An object is identical with itself, and no different indiscernible object can share that [Russell/Whitehead, by Adams,RM] |
| 10040 | Russell showed, through the paradoxes, that our basic logical intuitions are self-contradictory [Russell/Whitehead, by Gödel] |
| 21725 | The multiple relations theory says assertions about propositions are about their ingredients [Russell/Whitehead, by Linsky,B] |
| 23474 | A judgement is a complex entity, of mind and various objects [Russell/Whitehead] |
| 23455 | The meaning of 'Socrates is human' is completed by a judgement [Russell/Whitehead] |
| 23480 | The multiple relation theory of judgement couldn't explain the unity of sentences [Morris,M on Russell/Whitehead] |
| 18275 | Only the act of judging completes the meaning of a statement [Russell/Whitehead] |
| 23453 | Propositions as objects of judgement don't exist, because we judge several objects, not one [Russell/Whitehead] |
| 3772 | The will, in the beginning, is entirely produced by desire [Mill] |
| 3769 | With early training, any absurdity or evil may be given the power of conscience [Mill] |
| 3767 | Motive shows the worth of the agent, but not of the action [Mill] |
| 3771 | Virtues only have value because they achieve some further end [Mill] |
| 3768 | Orthodox morality is the only one which feels obligatory [Mill] |
| 7202 | The English believe in the task of annihilating evil for the victory of good [Nietzsche on Mill] |
| 5935 | Mill's qualities of pleasure is an admission that there are other good states of mind than pleasure [Ross on Mill] |
| 3764 | Actions are right if they promote pleasure, wrong if they promote pain [Mill] |
| 3776 | Utilitarianism only works if everybody has a totally equal right to happiness [Mill] |
| 3765 | Only pleasure and freedom from pain are desirable as ends [Mill] |
| 3763 | Ultimate goods such as pleasure can never be proved to be good [Mill] |
| 3766 | Better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied [Mill] |
| 3770 | General happiness is only desirable because individuals desire their own happiness [Mill] |
| 6697 | Moral rules protecting human welfare are more vital than local maxims [Mill] |
| 3774 | Rights are a matter of justice, not of benevolence [Mill] |
| 3773 | No individual has the right to receive our benevolence [Mill] |
| 3775 | A right is a valid claim to society's protection [Mill] |