Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Pragmatism and Deflationism' and 'Logical Necessity'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

24 ideas

3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
19108 Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak]
19094 For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak]
19105 Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak]
19100 Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak]
19099 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak]
19103 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / a. Tarski's truth definition
19101 Disquotation is bivalent [Misak]
19096 Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak]
19106 Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
19098 Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak]
19104 Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
12204 The logic of metaphysical necessity is S5 [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
12195 Soundness in argument varies with context, and may be achieved very informally indeed [Rumfitt]
12199 There is a modal element in consequence, in assessing reasoning from suppositions [Rumfitt]
12201 We reject deductions by bad consequence, so logical consequence can't be deduction [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
10121 Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor lack of contradiction a sign of truth [Pascal]
12194 Contradictions include 'This is red and not coloured', as well as the formal 'B and not-B' [Rumfitt]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 2. Axiomatic Proof
12198 Geometrical axioms in logic are nowadays replaced by inference rules (which imply the logical truths) [Rumfitt]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
19109 The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
14532 A distinctive type of necessity is found in logical consequence [Rumfitt, by Hale/Hoffmann,A]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12193 Logical necessity is when 'necessarily A' implies 'not-A is contradictory' [Rumfitt]
12200 A logically necessary statement need not be a priori, as it could be unknowable [Rumfitt]
12202 Narrow non-modal logical necessity may be metaphysical, but real logical necessity is not [Rumfitt]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
12203 If a world is a fully determinate way things could have been, can anyone consider such a thing? [Rumfitt]