Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Real Natures and Familiar Objects' and 'Pref to new 'Materialist Theory''

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14 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor lack of contradiction a sign of truth [Pascal]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Properties only have identity in the context of their contraries [Elder]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Maybe we should give up the statue [Elder]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
The loss of an essential property means the end of an existence [Elder]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Essential properties by nature occur in clusters or packages [Elder]
Essential properties are bound together, and would be lost together [Elder]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong]