18 ideas
11970 | Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan] |
10121 | Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor lack of contradiction a sign of truth [Pascal] |
11969 | Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan] |
11971 | The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan] |
11972 | Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan] |
11973 | Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan] |
19527 | We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson] |
19528 | Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson] |
19529 | Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson] |
19530 | A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson] |
19531 | Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson] |
19536 | Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson] |
19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
11967 | Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan] |
19534 | How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson] |
19535 | Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson] |
19533 | Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson] |
19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |