Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Against the Logicians (two books)' and 'In Defence of Pure Reason'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
3695 Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
22764 Ordinary speech is not exact about what is true; we say we are digging a well before the well exists [Sext.Empiricus]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
3651 Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
3700 Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
10121 Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor lack of contradiction a sign of truth [Pascal]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
22762 Some properties are inseparable from a thing, such as the length, breadth and depth of a body [Sext.Empiricus]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
3697 The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
3704 Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour]
3707 Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
22759 Fools, infants and madmen may speak truly, but do not know [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
3706 A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour]
3696 A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour]
3703 You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
3699 The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
3701 Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
22760 Madmen are reliable reporters of what appears to them [Sext.Empiricus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 10. Anti External Justification
3702 Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour]
14. Science / C. Induction / 2. Aims of Induction
3709 Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
3708 All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
22763 We can only dream of a winged man if we have experienced men and some winged thing [Sext.Empiricus]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
3698 Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour]