Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'Against the Physicists (two books)' and 'works'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


50 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure [Schaffer,J on Quine]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists [Quine, by Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Two things can never entail three things [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor lack of contradiction a sign of truth [Pascal]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts [Quine, by Hale]
Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction [Quine, by Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / b. Intuitionism
For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics [Quine, by Orenstein]
Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit' [Quine, by Orenstein]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Quine, by Hossack]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Quine, by Noonan]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories
For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications [Quine, by Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Quine, by Shapiro]
Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [Quine, by McGinn]
Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Quine, by Orenstein]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true [Quine, by Jacquette]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Quine, by Macdonald,C]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Parts are not parts if their whole is nothing more than the parts [Sext.Empiricus]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Quine, by Lycan]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically [Quine, by Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Some say motion is perceived by sense, but others say it is by intellect [Sext.Empiricus]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events [Quine, by Orenstein]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 4. Cultural relativism
To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it [Quine, by Newton-Smith]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations [Quine, by O'Grady]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
If we try to conceive of a line with no breadth, it ceases to exist, and so has no length [Sext.Empiricus]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 4. Emergentism
The incorporeal is not in the nature of body, and so could not emerge from it [Sext.Empiricus]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable' [Quine, by O'Grady]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants [Quine, by Miller,A]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Quine, by Almog]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
A man walking backwards on a forwards-moving ship is moving in a fixed place [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
Time doesn't end with the Universe, because tensed statements about destruction remain true [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
Time is divisible, into past, present and future [Sext.Empiricus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
Socrates either dies when he exists (before his death) or when he doesn't (after his death) [Sext.Empiricus]
If the present is just the limit of the past or the future, it can't exist because they don't exist [Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 2. Divine Nature
All men agree that God is blessed, imperishable, happy and good [Sext.Empiricus]
God must suffer to understand suffering [Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 3. Divine Perfections
The Divine must lack the virtues of continence and fortitude, because they are not needed [Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 1. Proof of God
God is defended by agreement, order, absurdity of denying God, and refutations [Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
God's sensations imply change, and hence perishing, which is absurd, so there is no such God [Sext.Empiricus]
God without virtue is absurd, but God's virtues will be better than God [Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The original substance lacked motion or shape, and was given these by a cause [Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 4. God Reflects Humanity
The perfections of God were extrapolations from mankind [Sext.Empiricus]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Gods were invented as watchers of people's secret actions [Sext.Empiricus]
An incorporeal God could do nothing, and a bodily god would perish, so there is no God [Sext.Empiricus]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 1. Animism
It is mad to think that what is useful to us, like lakes and rivers, are gods [Sext.Empiricus]