14 ideas
8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
10121 | Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor lack of contradiction a sign of truth [Pascal] |
8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
5691 | The adverbial account of sensation says not 'see a red image' but be 'appeared to redly' [Shoemaker] |
8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
5687 | For true introspection, must we be aware that we are aware of our mental events? [Shoemaker] |
5688 | Empirical foundationalism says basic knowledge is self-intimating, and incorrigible or infallible [Shoemaker] |