Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'works', 'On Carnap's Views on Ontology' and 'Truly Understood'

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11 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
22153 Quine rejects Carnap's view that science and philosophy are distinct [Quine, by Boulter]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 3. Contradiction
10121 Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor lack of contradiction a sign of truth [Pascal]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
19485 Names have no ontological commitment, because we can deny that they name anything [Quine]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
19486 We can use quantification for commitment to unnameable things like the real numbers [Quine]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
12608 Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
12605 A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
12607 Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
12609 Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
12604 Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
12610 Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
19487 Without the analytic/synthetic distinction, Carnap's ontology/empirical distinction collapses [Quine]