32 ideas
| 5035 | The two basics of reasoning are contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
| 6675 | The heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing [Pascal] |
| 22011 | The first principles of truth are not rational, but are known by the heart [Pascal] |
| 5038 | Assume that mind and body follow their own laws, but God has harmonised them [Leibniz] |
| 6681 | We only want to know things so that we can talk about them [Pascal] |
| 20014 | Actions include: the involuntary, the purposeful, the intentional, and the self-consciously autonomous [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20019 | Maybe bodily movements are not actions, but only part of an agent's action of moving [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20021 | Is the action the arm movement, the whole causal process, or just the trying to do it? [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20022 | To be intentional, an action must succeed in the manner in which it was planned [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20023 | If someone believes they can control the lottery, and then wins, the relevant skill is missing [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20025 | We might intend two ways to acting, knowing only one of them can succeed [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20031 | On one model, an intention is belief-desire states, and intentional actions relate to beliefs and desires [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20028 | Groups may act for reasons held by none of the members, so maybe groups are agents [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20027 | If there are shared obligations and intentions, we may need a primitive notion of 'joint commitment' [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20016 | Strong Cognitivism identifies an intention to act with a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20017 | Weak Cognitivism says intentions are only partly constituted by a belief [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20018 | Strong Cognitivism implies a mode of 'practical' knowledge, not based on observation [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20012 | Maybe the explanation of an action is in the reasons that make it intelligible to the agent [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20029 | Causalists allow purposive explanations, but then reduce the purpose to the action's cause [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20013 | It is generally assumed that reason explanations are causal [Wilson/Schpall] |
| 6676 | Painting makes us admire things of which we do not admire the originals [Pascal] |
| 6680 | It is a funny sort of justice whose limits are marked by a river [Pascal] |
| 6677 | Imagination creates beauty, justice and happiness, which is the supreme good [Pascal] |
| 6678 | We live for the past or future, and so are never happy in the present [Pascal] |
| 20732 | If man considers himself as lost and imprisoned in the universe, he will be terrified [Pascal] |
| 6682 | Majority opinion is visible and authoritative, although not very clever [Pascal] |
| 6679 | It is not good to be too free [Pascal] |
| 7455 | Pascal knows you can't force belief, but you can make it much more probable [Pascal, by Hacking] |
| 7457 | Pascal is right, but relies on the unsupported claim of a half as the chance of God's existence [Hacking on Pascal] |
| 7456 | The libertine would lose a life of enjoyable sin if he chose the cloisters [Hacking on Pascal] |
| 6684 | If you win the wager on God's existence you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing [Pascal] |
| 5037 | God doesn't decide that Adam will sin, but that sinful Adam's existence is to be preferred [Leibniz] |