Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Source of Necessity', 'Response to David Armstrong' and 'Sophistical Refutations'

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13 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
Didactic argument starts from the principles of the subject, not from the opinions of the learner [Aristotle]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Reasoning is a way of making statements which makes them lead on to other statements [Aristotle]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic aims to start from generally accepted opinions, and lead to a contradiction [Aristotle]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 3. Eristic
Competitive argument aims at refutation, fallacy, paradox, solecism or repetition [Aristotle]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
'Are Coriscus and Callias at home?' sounds like a single question, but it isn't [Aristotle]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
Space, time, and some other basics, are not causal powers [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
Generic terms like 'man' are not substances, but qualities, relations, modes or some such thing [Aristotle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Only if two things are identical do they have the same attributes [Aristotle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale]
Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale]
The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale]