Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Absolute Necessities', 'Truth-makers and dependence' and 'Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value'

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22 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
17325 Truth-maker theory can't cope with non-causal dependence [Liggins]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
17318 Truthmakers for existence is fine; otherwise maybe restrict it to synthetic truths? [Liggins]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
17320 Either p is true or not-p is true, so something is true, so something exists [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17326 The dependence of {Socrates} on Socrates involves a set and a philosopher, not facts [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
17327 Non-causal dependence is at present only dimly understood [Liggins]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
17322 Necessities supervene on everything, but don't depend on everything [Liggins]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
15086 Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
8261 Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale]
15081 A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale]
15080 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
15082 Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
15085 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale]
15088 Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
15087 Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
17324 'Because' can signal an inference rather than an explanation [Liggins]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17321 Value, constitution and realisation are non-causal dependences that explain [Liggins]
17323 If explanations track dependence, then 'determinative' explanations seem to exist [Liggins]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18225 If we can't reason about value, we can reason about the unconditional source of value [Korsgaard]
18228 An end can't be an ultimate value just because it is useless! [Korsgaard]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
18224 Goodness is given either by a psychological state, or the attribution of a property [Korsgaard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / g. Contemplation
18233 Contemplation is final because it is an activity which is not a process [Korsgaard]
18226 For Aristotle, contemplation consists purely of understanding [Korsgaard]