42 ideas
| 10308 | Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms [Hale] |
| 10314 | An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase [Hale] |
| 18915 | If facts are the truthmakers, they are not in the world [Engelbretsen] |
| 18919 | There are no 'falsifying' facts, only an absence of truthmakers [Engelbretsen] |
| 18913 | Traditional term logic struggled to express relations [Engelbretsen] |
| 18907 | Term logic rests on negated terms or denial, and that propositions are tied pairs [Engelbretsen] |
| 18912 | Was logic a branch of mathematics, or mathematics a branch of logic? [Engelbretsen] |
| 18922 | Logical syntax is actually close to surface linguistic form [Engelbretsen] |
| 18905 | Propositions can be analysed as pairs of terms glued together by predication [Engelbretsen] |
| 18908 | Standard logic only negates sentences, even via negated general terms or predicates [Engelbretsen] |
| 10316 | We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage [Hale] |
| 10312 | Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference [Hale] |
| 10313 | Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment [Hale] |
| 10322 | If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects [Hale] |
| 18917 | Existence and nonexistence are characteristics of the world, not of objects [Engelbretsen] |
| 10512 | The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located [Hale] |
| 10517 | Colours and points seem to be both concrete and abstract [Hale] |
| 10519 | The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names [Hale] |
| 10520 | Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract [Hale] |
| 10524 | There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations [Hale] |
| 18916 | Facts are not in the world - they are properties of the world [Engelbretsen] |
| 18921 | Individuals are arranged in inclusion categories that match our semantics [Engelbretsen] |
| 10521 | If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations [Hale] |
| 10511 | It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale] |
| 10318 | Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns [Hale] |
| 10310 | Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated [Hale] |
| 10518 | Shapes and directions are of something, but games and musical compositions are not [Hale] |
| 10513 | Many abstract objects, such as chess, seem non-spatial, but are not atemporal [Hale] |
| 10514 | If the mental is non-spatial but temporal, then it must be classified as abstract [Hale] |
| 10523 | Being abstract is based on a relation between things which are spatially separated [Hale] |
| 10307 | The modern Fregean use of the term 'object' is much broader than the ordinary usage [Hale] |
| 10315 | We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale] |
| 10522 | The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale] |
| 10321 | We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale] |
| 6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
| 6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
| 6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
| 6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
| 18918 | Terms denote objects with properties, and statements denote the world with that property [Engelbretsen] |
| 6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |
| 18920 | 'Socrates is wise' denotes a sentence; 'that Socrates is wise' denotes a proposition [Engelbretsen] |
| 18906 | Negating a predicate term and denying its unnegated version are quite different [Engelbretsen] |