Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Commentary on Sentences', 'Varieties of Ontological Dependence' and 'Treatise 2: Virtue or Moral Good'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
17311 Real definitions don't just single out a thing; they must also explain its essence [Koslicki]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / a. Axioms for numbers
17312 It is more explanatory if you show how a number is constructed from basic entities and relations [Koslicki]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17314 The relata of grounding are propositions or facts, but for dependence it is objects and their features [Koslicki]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
16643 Accidents always remain suited to a subject [Bonaventura]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
17313 Modern views want essences just to individuate things across worlds and times [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17309 For Fine, essences are propositions true because of identity, so they are just real definitions [Koslicki]
17315 We need a less propositional view of essence, and so must distinguish it clearly from real definitions [Koslicki]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 6. Successive Things
16696 Successive things reduce to permanent things [Bonaventura]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
17317 A good explanation captures the real-world dependence among the phenomena [Koslicki]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
17316 We can abstract to a dependent entity by blocking out features of its bearer [Koslicki]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
6248 Reason is too slow and doubtful to guide all actions, which need external and moral senses [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
6238 We approve of actions by a superior moral sense [Hutcheson]
6239 We dislike a traitor, even if they give us great benefit [Hutcheson]
6240 The moral sense is not an innate idea, but an ability to approve or disapprove in a disinterested way [Hutcheson]
6242 We cannot choose our moral feelings, otherwise bribery could affect them [Hutcheson]
6247 Everyone feels uneasy when seeing others in pain, unless the others are evil [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
6244 Human nature seems incapable of universal malice, except what results from self-love [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
6243 As death approaches, why do we still care about family, friends or country? [Hutcheson]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
6246 My action is not made good by a good effect, if I did not foresee and intend it [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
6241 Contempt of danger is just madness if it is not in some worthy cause [Hutcheson]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
6245 That action is best, which procures the greatest happiness for the greatest number [Hutcheson]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
6251 The loss of perfect rights causes misery, but the loss of imperfect rights reduces social good [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
6250 We say God is good if we think everything he does aims at the happiness of his creatures [Hutcheson]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
6249 If goodness is constituted by God's will, it is a tautology to say God's will is good [Hutcheson]