Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Prescriptivism', 'Essence, Necessity and Explanation' and 'Causal Explanation'

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23 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
15118 A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
15116 Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 6. Verisimilitude
15557 Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
15554 A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
15110 An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
15113 Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
15112 If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
15560 We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur [Lewis]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 2. Demonstration
15111 In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki]
15115 In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
15559 Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
15556 Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / f. Necessity in explanations
15558 A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen [Lewis]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
4809 Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation [Lewis, by Psillos]
14321 To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history [Lewis]
15117 Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
15114 Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2854 Prescriptivism says 'ought' without commitment to act is insincere, or weakly used [Hooker,B]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
2856 Universal moral judgements imply the Golden Rule ('do as you would be done by') [Hooker,B]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
15555 Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
15552 We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry. [Lewis]
15551 Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right' [Lewis]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
15553 Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events [Lewis]