Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Nature of Thought', 'Thought and Talk' and 'Explanation and Reference'

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16 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Using proper names properly doesn't involve necessary and sufficient conditions [Putnam]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
Putnam bases essences on 'same kind', but same kinds may not share properties [Mackie,P on Putnam]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science aims at truth, not at 'simplicity' [Putnam]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Thought depends on speech [Davidson]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 8. Human Thought
A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
I now think reference by the tests of experts is a special case of being causally connected [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 5. Reference to Natural Kinds
Natural kind stereotypes are 'strong' (obvious, like tiger) or 'weak' (obscure, like molybdenum) [Putnam]
Express natural kinds as a posteriori predicate connections, not as singular terms [Putnam, by Mackie,P]