Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Nature of Thought', 'Aristotle on Matter' and 'Metaphysics: contemporary introduction'

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14 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Full coherence might involve consistency and mutual entailment of all propositions [Blanshard, by Dancy,J]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Coherence tests for truth without implying correspondence, so truth is not correspondence [Blanshard, by Young,JO]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux]
Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K]
Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K]