Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable', 'Change in View: Principles of Reasoning' and 'Evidentialism'

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34 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman]
The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman]
If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman]
Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
A set is 'well-ordered' if every subset has a first element [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
Set theory made a closer study of infinity possible [Clegg]
Any set can always generate a larger set - its powerset, of subsets [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
Extensionality: Two sets are equal if and only if they have the same elements [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Pairing: For any two sets there exists a set to which they both belong [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / d. Axiom of Unions III
Unions: There is a set of all the elements which belong to at least one set in a collection [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity: There exists a set of the empty set and the successor of each element [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / g. Axiom of Powers VI
Powers: All the subsets of a given set form their own new powerset [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Choice: For every set a mechanism will choose one member of any non-empty subset [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / k. Axiom of Existence
Axiom of Existence: there exists at least one set [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / l. Axiom of Specification
Specification: a condition applied to a set will always produce a new set [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics can be 'pure' (unapplied), 'real' (physically grounded); or 'applied' (just applicable) [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Beyond infinity cardinals and ordinals can come apart [Clegg]
An ordinal number is defined by the set that comes before it [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Transcendental numbers can't be fitted to finite equations [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / k. Imaginary numbers
By adding an axis of imaginary numbers, we get the useful 'number plane' instead of number line [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
Either lack of zero made early mathematics geometrical, or the geometrical approach made zero meaningless [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Cantor's account of infinities has the shaky foundation of irrational numbers [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The Continuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of set theory [Clegg]
The 'continuum hypothesis' says aleph-one is the cardinality of the reals [Clegg]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman]
High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Involuntary beliefs can still be evaluated [Feldman/Conee]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / b. Evidentialism
Evidentialism is the view that justification is determined by the quality of the evidence [Feldman/Conee]
Beliefs should fit evidence, and if you ought to believe it, then you are justified [Feldman/Conee]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]
Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
If someone rejects good criticism through arrogance, that is irrelevant to whether they have knowledge [Feldman/Conee]