54 ideas
8187 | Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions [Frege, by Dummett] |
10859 | A set is 'well-ordered' if every subset has a first element [Clegg] |
10857 | Set theory made a closer study of infinity possible [Clegg] |
10864 | Any set can always generate a larger set - its powerset, of subsets [Clegg] |
10872 | Extensionality: Two sets are equal if and only if they have the same elements [Clegg] |
10875 | Pairing: For any two sets there exists a set to which they both belong [Clegg] |
10876 | Unions: There is a set of all the elements which belong to at least one set in a collection [Clegg] |
10878 | Infinity: There exists a set of the empty set and the successor of each element [Clegg] |
10877 | Powers: All the subsets of a given set form their own new powerset [Clegg] |
10879 | Choice: For every set a mechanism will choose one member of any non-empty subset [Clegg] |
10871 | Axiom of Existence: there exists at least one set [Clegg] |
10874 | Specification: a condition applied to a set will always produce a new set [Clegg] |
18772 | We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name [Frege] |
14075 | Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard] |
10424 | A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury] |
18773 | People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege] |
4978 | The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege] |
10510 | Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Frege, by Hale] |
18937 | If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer] |
18940 | It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege] |
18939 | In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege] |
9462 | Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first [Frege, by Jacquette] |
18936 | Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense' [Frege, by Sawyer] |
10880 | Mathematics can be 'pure' (unapplied), 'real' (physically grounded); or 'applied' (just applicable) [Clegg] |
10861 | Beyond infinity cardinals and ordinals can come apart [Clegg] |
10860 | An ordinal number is defined by the set that comes before it [Clegg] |
10854 | Transcendental numbers can't be fitted to finite equations [Clegg] |
10858 | By adding an axis of imaginary numbers, we get the useful 'number plane' instead of number line [Clegg] |
10853 | Either lack of zero made early mathematics geometrical, or the geometrical approach made zero meaningless [Clegg] |
10866 | Cantor's account of infinities has the shaky foundation of irrational numbers [Clegg] |
10869 | The Continuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of set theory [Clegg] |
10862 | The 'continuum hypothesis' says aleph-one is the cardinality of the reals [Clegg] |
10533 | We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing [Frege, by Dummett] |
4893 | Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry] |
23283 | Necessity implies possibility, but in experience it matters which comes first [Williams,B] |
18752 | 'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee] |
22318 | Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter] |
4980 | The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege] |
9180 | Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language [Frege, by Dummett] |
4981 | The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence [Frege] |
15597 | Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Frege, by Fine,K] |
17002 | Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke on Frege] |
18778 | Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference [Frege] |
7805 | Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
4976 | The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense [Frege] |
4977 | In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference [Frege] |
4979 | We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth [Frege] |
15155 | Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Frege, by Soames] |
11126 | 'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence] |
8164 | Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett] |
9817 | Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett] |
8171 | Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett] |
4954 | Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege] |
7304 | Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |