Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Infinity: Quest to Think the Unthinkable', 'Summa Contra Gentiles' and 'Naming and Necessity notes and addenda'

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37 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Wise people should contemplate and discuss the truth, and fight against falsehood [Aquinas]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
A set is 'well-ordered' if every subset has a first element [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / d. Infinite Sets
Set theory made a closer study of infinity possible [Clegg]
Any set can always generate a larger set - its powerset, of subsets [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
Extensionality: Two sets are equal if and only if they have the same elements [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
Pairing: For any two sets there exists a set to which they both belong [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / d. Axiom of Unions III
Unions: There is a set of all the elements which belong to at least one set in a collection [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
Infinity: There exists a set of the empty set and the successor of each element [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / g. Axiom of Powers VI
Powers: All the subsets of a given set form their own new powerset [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Choice: For every set a mechanism will choose one member of any non-empty subset [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / k. Axiom of Existence
Axiom of Existence: there exists at least one set [Clegg]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / l. Axiom of Specification
Specification: a condition applied to a set will always produce a new set [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
Mathematics can be 'pure' (unapplied), 'real' (physically grounded); or 'applied' (just applicable) [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Beyond infinity cardinals and ordinals can come apart [Clegg]
An ordinal number is defined by the set that comes before it [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / g. Real numbers
Transcendental numbers can't be fitted to finite equations [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / k. Imaginary numbers
By adding an axis of imaginary numbers, we get the useful 'number plane' instead of number line [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / l. Zero
Either lack of zero made early mathematics geometrical, or the geometrical approach made zero meaningless [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / a. The Infinite
Cantor's account of infinities has the shaky foundation of irrational numbers [Clegg]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The Continuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of set theory [Clegg]
The 'continuum hypothesis' says aleph-one is the cardinality of the reals [Clegg]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
We might fix identities for small particulars, but it is utopian to hope for such things [Kripke]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
A different piece of wood could have been used for that table; constitution isn't identity [Wiggins on Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
A relation can clearly be reflexive, and identity is the smallest reflexive relation [Kripke]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
A vague identity may seem intransitive, and we might want to talk of 'counterparts' [Kripke]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
What many people consider merely physically necessary I consider completely necessary [Kripke]
What is often held to be mere physical necessity is actually metaphysical necessity [Kripke]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Unicorns are vague, so no actual or possible creature could count as a unicorn [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
Possible worlds are useful in set theory, but can be very misleading elsewhere [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
Kaplan's 'Dthat' is a useful operator for transforming a description into a rigid designation [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
The best known objection to counterparts is Kripke's, that Humphrey doesn't care if his counterpart wins [Kripke, by Sider]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
The a priori analytic truths involving fixing of reference are contingent [Kripke]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
I regard the mind-body problem as wide open, and extremely confusing [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Without God's influence every operation would stop, so God causes everything [Aquinas]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / c. Social reference
A description may fix a reference even when it is not true of its object [Kripke]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / b. Reference by description
Even if Gödel didn't produce his theorems, he's still called 'Gödel' [Kripke]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / f. Eternalism
Eternity coexists with passing time, as the centre of a circle coexists with its circumference [Aquinas]