Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Katzav on limitations of dispositions', 'Phenomenalism' and 'Law and Causality'

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12 ideas

10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
Ramsey's Test: believe the consequent if you believe the antecedent [Ramsey, by Read]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
Asking 'If p, will q?' when p is uncertain, then first add p hypothetically to your knowledge [Ramsey]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 8. Ramsey Sentences
Mental terms can be replaced in a sentence by a variable and an existential quantifier [Ramsey]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / b. Best system theory
All knowledge needs systematizing, and the axioms would be the laws of nature [Ramsey]
Causal laws result from the simplest axioms of a complete deductive system [Ramsey]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis]