31 ideas
19740 | A very hungry man cannot choose between equidistant piles of food [Aristotle] |
14064 | If a statue is identical with the clay of which it is made, that identity is contingent [Gibbard] |
14066 | A 'piece' of clay begins when its parts stick together, separately from other clay [Gibbard] |
14067 | Clay and statue are two objects, which can be named and reasoned about [Gibbard] |
14069 | We can only investigate the identity once we have designated it as 'statue' or as 'clay' [Gibbard] |
14076 | Essentialism is the existence of a definite answer as to whether an entity fulfils a condition [Gibbard] |
14077 | Essentialism for concreta is false, since they can come apart under two concepts [Gibbard] |
14070 | A particular statue has sortal persistence conditions, so its origin defines it [Gibbard] |
14073 | Claims on contingent identity seem to violate Leibniz's Law [Gibbard] |
14065 | Two identical things must share properties - including creation and destruction times [Gibbard] |
14074 | Leibniz's Law isn't just about substitutivity, because it must involve properties and relations [Gibbard] |
14072 | Possible worlds identity needs a sortal [Gibbard] |
14078 | Only concepts, not individuals, can be the same across possible worlds [Gibbard] |
14079 | Kripke's semantics needs lots of intuitions about which properties are essential [Gibbard] |
14071 | Naming a thing in the actual world also invokes some persistence criteria [Gibbard] |
398 | Each thing that has a function is for the sake of that function [Aristotle] |
394 | An unworn sandal is in vain, but nothing in nature is in vain [Aristotle] |
396 | There has to be some goal, and not just movement to infinity [Aristotle] |
16102 | Aether moves in circles and is imperishable; the four elements perish, and move in straight lines [Aristotle, by Gill,ML] |
17463 | An element is what bodies are analysed into, and won't itself divide into something else [Aristotle] |
6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis] |
6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis] |
6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis] |
6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis] |
6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis] |
399 | If the more you raise some earth the faster it moves, why does the whole earth not move? [Aristotle] |
20918 | Void is a kind of place, so it can't explain place [Aristotle] |
403 | The earth must be round and of limited size, because moving north or south makes different stars visible [Aristotle] |
402 | The Earth must be spherical, because it casts a convex shadow on the moon [Aristotle] |
1498 | Everyone agrees that the world had a beginning, but thinkers disagree over whether it will end [Aristotle] |
395 | It seems possible that there exists a limited number of other worlds apart from this one [Aristotle] |