8 ideas
16776 | Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus] |
4691 | If all mental life were conscious, we would be unable to see things, or to process speech [McGinn] |
4690 | If meaning is speaker's intentions, it can be reduced to propositional attitudes, and philosophy of mind [McGinn] |
6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis] |
6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis] |
6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis] |
6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis] |
6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis] |