33 ideas
12667 | Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis] |
13591 | Quantified modal logic collapses if essence is withdrawn [Quine] |
12666 | We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis] |
12688 | Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis] |
12683 | Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12670 | A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis] |
12673 | Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis] |
12665 | I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis] |
12682 | Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis] |
12684 | Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis] |
12672 | Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis] |
12676 | Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis] |
23781 | Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE] |
12686 | Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis] |
15453 | The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis] |
12685 | Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis] |
15452 | We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures [Lewis] |
12679 | A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis] |
13590 | Essences can make sense in a particular context or enquiry, as the most basic predicates [Quine] |
12668 | Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis] |
8483 | Necessity is relative to context; it is what is assumed in an inquiry [Quine] |
12687 | Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis] |
13589 | Possible worlds are a way to dramatise essentialism, and yet they presuppose essentialism [Quine] |
13588 | A rigid designator (for all possible worlds) picks out an object by its essential traits [Quine] |
13592 | Beliefs can be ascribed to machines [Quine] |
12669 | Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis] |
12681 | There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis] |
12680 | Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis] |
12675 | Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis] |
12671 | I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis] |
12674 | Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis] |
12689 | Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis] |
12690 | The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis] |