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All the ideas for 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism', 'Conditionals' and 'Frege philosophy of mathematics'

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56 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
A contextual definition permits the elimination of the expression by a substitution [Dummett]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 6. Classical Logic
In classical logic, logical truths are valid formulas; in higher-order logics they are purely logical [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
A prime number is one which is measured by a unit alone [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / c. Priority of numbers
Addition of quantities is prior to ordering, as shown in cyclic domains like angles [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / a. Units
A number is a multitude composed of units [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
We understand 'there are as many nuts as apples' as easily by pairing them as by counting them [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / e. Structuralism critique
The identity of a number may be fixed by something outside structure - by counting [Dummett]
Numbers aren't fixed by position in a structure; it won't tell you whether to start with 0 or 1 [Dummett]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Set theory isn't part of logic, and why reduce to something more complex? [Dummett]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 7. Abstract/Concrete / a. Abstract/concrete
The distinction of concrete/abstract, or actual/non-actual, is a scale, not a dichotomy [Dummett]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism is just the application of two-valued semantics to sentences [Dummett]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis]
Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis]
Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Nominalism assumes unmediated mental contact with objects [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
The existence of abstract objects is a pseudo-problem [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / c. Modern abstracta
Abstract objects nowadays are those which are objective but not actual [Dummett]
It is absurd to deny the Equator, on the grounds that it lacks causal powers [Dummett]
'We've crossed the Equator' has truth-conditions, so accept the Equator - and it's an object [Dummett]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / d. Problems with abstracta
Abstract objects need the context principle, since they can't be encountered directly [Dummett]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Content is replaceable if identical, so replaceability can't define identity [Dummett, by Dummett]
Frege introduced criteria for identity, but thought defining identity was circular [Dummett]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / i. Conceptual priority
Maybe a concept is 'prior' to another if it can be defined without the second concept [Dummett]
An argument for conceptual priority is greater simplicity in explanation [Dummett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
Abstract terms are acceptable as long as we know how they function linguistically [Dummett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
There is no reason why abstraction by equivalence classes should be called 'logical' [Dummett, by Tait]
We arrive at the concept 'suicide' by comparing 'Cato killed Cato' with 'Brutus killed Brutus' [Dummett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
To abstract from spoons (to get the same number as the forks), the spoons must be indistinguishable too [Dummett]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Why should the limit of measurement be points, not intervals? [Dummett]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis]