Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Katzav on limitations of dispositions', 'Change in View: Principles of Reasoning' and 'The Scientific Image'

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20 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
The rules of reasoning are not the rules of logic [Harman]
It is a principle of reasoning not to clutter your mind with trivialities [Harman]
If there is a great cost to avoiding inconsistency, we learn to reason our way around it [Harman]
Logic has little relevance to reasoning, except when logical conclusions are immediate [Harman]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Implication just accumulates conclusions, but inference may also revise our views [Harman]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Empiricists deny what is unobservable, and reject objective modality [Fraassen]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
The Gambler's Fallacy (ten blacks, so red is due) overemphasises the early part of a sequence [Harman]
High probability premises need not imply high probability conclusions [Harman]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
We strongly desire to believe what is true, even though logic does not require it [Harman]
To 'accept' a theory is not to believe it, but to believe it empirically adequate [Fraassen, by Bird]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence [Harman]
Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another [Harman]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
To accept a scientific theory, we only need to believe that it is empirically adequate [Fraassen]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
Why should the true explanation be one of the few we have actually thought of? [Fraassen, by Bird]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 4. Explanation Doubts / a. Explanation as pragmatic
An explanation is just descriptive information answering a particular question [Fraassen, by Salmon]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis]