17 ideas
| 6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
| 11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
| 6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
| 6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
| 6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |
| 11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
| 6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
| 6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |
| 5122 | Maybe consequentialism is a critique of ordinary morality, rather than describing it [Harman] |
| 5123 | Maybe there is no such thing as character, and the virtues and vices said to accompany it [Harman] |
| 5124 | If a person's two acts of timidity have different explanations, they are not one character trait [Harman] |
| 5125 | Virtue ethics might involve judgements about the virtues of actions, rather than character [Harman] |
| 6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis] |
| 6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis] |
| 6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis] |
| 6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis] |
| 6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis] |