15 ideas
| 15527 | Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination [Lewis] |
| 5040 | Necessary truths can be analysed into original truths; contingent truths are infinitely analysable [Leibniz] |
| 13159 | Only God sees contingent truths a priori [Leibniz] |
| 15530 | A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world [Lewis] |
| 5039 | If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary [Leibniz] |
| 15531 | The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation [Lewis] |
| 15528 | A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what [Lewis] |
| 15526 | There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand [Lewis] |
| 15529 | It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible [Lewis] |
| 6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis] |
| 6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis] |
| 6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis] |
| 6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis] |
| 6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis] |
| 5041 | God does everything in a perfect way, and never acts contrary to reason [Leibniz] |