18 ideas
10928 | Maybe we can quantify modally if the objects are intensional, but it seems unlikely [Quine] |
10925 | Failure of substitutivity shows that a personal name is not purely referential [Quine] |
10926 | Quantifying into referentially opaque contexts often produces nonsense [Quine] |
10930 | Quantification into modal contexts requires objects to have an essence [Quine] |
14645 | To be necessarily greater than 7 is not a trait of 7, but depends on how 7 is referred to [Quine] |
9201 | Whether 9 is necessarily greater than 7 depends on how '9' is described [Quine, by Fine,K] |
10927 | Necessity only applies to objects if they are distinctively specified [Quine] |
5040 | Necessary truths can be analysed into original truths; contingent truths are infinitely analysable [Leibniz] |
13159 | Only God sees contingent truths a priori [Leibniz] |
9203 | We can't quantify in modal contexts, because the modality depends on descriptions, not objects [Quine, by Fine,K] |
5039 | If non-existents are possible, their existence would replace what now exists, which cannot therefore be necessary [Leibniz] |
6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis] |
6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis] |
6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis] |
6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis] |
6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis] |
10931 | We can't say 'necessarily if x is in water then x dissolves' if we can't quantify modally [Quine] |
5041 | God does everything in a perfect way, and never acts contrary to reason [Leibniz] |