17 ideas
| 8368 | A correct definition is what can be substituted without loss of meaning [Ducasse] |
| 13655 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show that whether all sets are constructible is indeterminate [Putnam, by Shapiro] |
| 9915 | V = L just says all sets are constructible [Putnam] |
| 9913 | The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorem is close to an antinomy in philosophy of language [Putnam] |
| 9914 | It is unfashionable, but most mathematical intuitions come from nature [Putnam] |
| 6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis] |
| 8367 | Causation is defined in terms of a single sequence, and constant conjunction is no part of it [Ducasse] |
| 8372 | We see what is in common between causes to assign names to them, not to perceive them [Ducasse] |
| 8369 | Causes are either sufficient, or necessary, or necessitated, or contingent upon [Ducasse] |
| 8373 | When a brick and a canary-song hit a window, we ignore the canary if we are interested in the breakage [Ducasse] |
| 8370 | A cause is a change which occurs close to the effect and just before it [Ducasse] |
| 8371 | Recurrence is only relevant to the meaning of law, not to the meaning of cause [Ducasse] |
| 8374 | We are interested in generalising about causes and effects purely for practical purposes [Ducasse] |
| 6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis] |
| 6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis] |
| 6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis] |
| 6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis] |