Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Katzav on limitations of dispositions', 'There is immediate Justification' and 'Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula'

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23 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
15134 The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
15141 Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson]
15140 The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
15131 If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
15135 If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson]
15139 Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
18492 Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
15136 Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
15138 Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
15137 If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
15142 Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
8845 An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / e. Pro-foundations
8842 The best argument for immediate justification is not the Regress Argument, but considering examples [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
8843 Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists [Pryor]
8844 Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
8846 Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 5. Controlling Beliefs
8847 Beliefs are not chosen, but you can seek ways to influence your belief [Pryor]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
6613 The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
6616 Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
6615 A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
6614 A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
6612 Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
15133 A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson]