14 ideas
| 23651 | Universals are not objects of sense and cannot be imagined - but can be conceived [Reid] |
| 23650 | Only individuals exist [Reid] |
| 23649 | No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white [Reid] |
| 11874 | Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid] |
| 7876 | Even if we identify pain with neural events, we can't explain why those neurons cause that feeling [Levine, by Papineau] |
| 7877 | Only phenomenal states have an explanatory gap; water is fully explained by H2O [Levine, by Papineau] |
| 7878 | Materialism won't explain phenomenal properties, because the latter aren't seen in causal roles [Papineau on Levine] |
| 23652 | We must first conceive things before we can consider them [Reid] |
| 23648 | First we notice and name attributes ('abstracting'); then we notice that subjects share them ('generalising') [Reid] |
| 6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis] |
| 6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis] |
| 6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis] |
| 6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis] |
| 6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis] |