19 ideas
| 23623 | Predicativism says only predicated sets exist [Hossack] |
| 23624 | The iterative conception has to appropriate Replacement, to justify the ordinals [Hossack] |
| 23625 | Limitation of Size justifies Replacement, but then has to appropriate Power Set [Hossack] |
| 23628 | The connective 'and' can have an order-sensitive meaning, as 'and then' [Hossack] |
| 23627 | 'Before' and 'after' are not two relations, but one relation with two orders [Hossack] |
| 23626 | Transfinite ordinals are needed in proof theory, and for recursive functions and computability [Hossack] |
| 23621 | Numbers are properties, not sets (because numbers are magnitudes) [Hossack] |
| 23622 | We can only mentally construct potential infinities, but maths needs actual infinities [Hossack] |
| 22384 | A 'double effect' is a foreseen but not desired side-effect, which may be forgivable [Foot] |
| 22385 | The doctrine of double effect can excuse an outcome because it wasn't directly intended [Foot] |
| 22386 | Double effect says foreseeing you will kill someone is not the same as intending it [Foot] |
| 22387 | Without double effect, bad men can make us do evil by threatening something worse [Foot] |
| 22388 | Double effect seems to rely on a distinction between what we do and what we allow [Foot] |
| 22383 | Abortion is puzzling because we do and don't want the unborn child to have rights [Foot] |
| 6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis] |
| 6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis] |
| 6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis] |
| 6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis] |
| 6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis] |