17 ideas
| 15545 | Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions [Lewis] |
| 2661 | Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument [Cicero] |
| 2673 | There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero] |
| 15546 | Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists [Lewis] |
| 15548 | Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly [Lewis] |
| 14399 | Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on [Lewis] |
| 2669 | Dialectic assumes that all statements are either true or false, but self-referential paradoxes are a big problem [Cicero] |
| 15543 | How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine [Lewis] |
| 2664 | If we have complete healthy senses, what more could the gods give us? [Cicero] |
| 2665 | How can there be a memory of what is false? [Cicero] |
| 20800 | Every true presentation can have a false one of the same quality [Cicero] |
| 2672 | Virtues must be very detached, to avoid being motivated by pleasure [Cicero] |
| 6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis] |
| 6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis] |
| 6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis] |
| 6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis] |
| 6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis] |