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All the ideas for 'Katzav on limitations of dispositions', 'Academica' and 'Propositions'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
2661 Dialectic is speech cast in the form of logical argument [Cicero]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
2673 There cannot be more than one truth [Cicero]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
13941 Are the truth-bearers sentences, utterances, ideas, beliefs, judgements, propositions or statements? [Cartwright,R]
13942 Logicians take sentences to be truth-bearers for rigour, rather than for philosophical reasons [Cartwright,R]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
2669 Dialectic assumes that all statements are either true or false, but self-referential paradoxes are a big problem [Cicero]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
13945 A token isn't a unique occurrence, as the case of a word or a number shows [Cartwright,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
2664 If we have complete healthy senses, what more could the gods give us? [Cicero]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
2665 How can there be a memory of what is false? [Cicero]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
20800 Every true presentation can have a false one of the same quality [Cicero]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
13950 People don't assert the meaning of the words they utter [Cartwright,R]
13948 For any statement, there is no one meaning which any sentence asserting it must have [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
13944 We can pull apart assertion from utterance, and the action, the event and the subject-matter for each [Cartwright,R]
13947 'It's raining' makes a different assertion on different occasions, but its meaning remains the same [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13943 We can attribute 'true' and 'false' to whatever it was that was said [Cartwright,R]
13946 To assert that p, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to utter some particular words [Cartwright,R]
19. Language / F. Communication / 2. Assertion
13951 Assertions, unlike sentence meanings, can be accurate, probable, exaggerated, false.... [Cartwright,R]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
2672 Virtues must be very detached, to avoid being motivated by pleasure [Cicero]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
6613 The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
6616 Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
6615 A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
6614 A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
6612 Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis]