Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Katzav on limitations of dispositions', 'Introduction to Zermelo's 1930 paper' and 'Intellectual Autobiography'

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18 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18901 Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 3. Term Logic
18904 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
18895 Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
17833 The first-order ZF axiomatisation is highly non-categorical [Hallett,M]
17834 Non-categoricity reveals a sort of incompleteness, with sets existing that the axioms don't reveal [Hallett,M]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
17837 Zermelo allows ur-elements, to enable the widespread application of set-theory [Hallett,M]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
18897 Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
18893 Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
18903 Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
18894 Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
17836 The General Continuum Hypothesis and its negation are both consistent with ZF [Hallett,M]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
18900 Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
18898 In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
6613 The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
6616 Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
6615 A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
6614 A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
6612 Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis]