Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Katzav on limitations of dispositions', 'Cardinality, Counting and Equinumerosity' and 'The Logic of Scientific Discovery'

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25 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
22358 Scientific objectivity lies in inter-subjective testing [Popper]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
17453 The meaning of a number isn't just the numerals leading up to it [Heck]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / f. Cardinal numbers
17457 A basic grasp of cardinal numbers needs an understanding of equinumerosity [Heck]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17448 In counting, numerals are used, not mentioned (as objects that have to correlated) [Heck]
17455 Is counting basically mindless, and independent of the cardinality involved? [Heck]
17456 Counting is the assignment of successively larger cardinal numbers to collections [Heck]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / e. Counting by correlation
17450 Understanding 'just as many' needn't involve grasping one-one correspondence [Heck]
17451 We can know 'just as many' without the concepts of equinumerosity or numbers [Heck]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
17459 Frege's Theorem explains why the numbers satisfy the Peano axioms [Heck]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / b. Against mathematical platonism
17454 Children can use numbers, without a concept of them as countable objects [Heck]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
17458 Equinumerosity is not the same concept as one-one correspondence [Heck]
17449 We can understand cardinality without the idea of one-one correspondence [Heck]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
22188 Give Nobel Prizes for really good refutations? [Gorham on Popper]
7780 Falsification is the criterion of demarcation between science and non-science [Popper, by Magee]
16830 We don't only reject hypotheses because we have falsified them [Lipton on Popper]
6794 If falsification requires logical inconsistency, then probabilistic statements can't be falsified [Bird on Popper]
6795 When Popper gets in difficulties, he quietly uses induction to help out [Bird on Popper]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
3856 Good theories have empirical content, explain a lot, and are not falsified [Popper, by Newton-Smith]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
7779 There is no such thing as induction [Popper, by Magee]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
3860 Science cannot be shown to be rational if induction is rejected [Newton-Smith on Popper]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
6613 The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
6616 Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
6615 A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
6614 A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
6612 Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis]